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THE COURT AT THE EPICENTER OF A NEW
CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE: HIV/AIDS IN
THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS
ARMEN H. MERJA
"Very often, ordinary people found that the policies put in
force during an epidemic-the quick burial of corpses in lime in
mass graves, confiscation of the property of the dead, closings of
markets, establishment of quarantining-posed far greater
threats to their world of lived experience and expectation than
the disease itself."
-Sheldon Watts'
INTRODUCTION
When the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)2 first emerged on
the American scene in the early 1980s, 3 little was known about
the disease except that it was incurable, fatal, and transmissible.
The specter of such a horrifying new "plague,"4 whose routes of
t Member, New York and Connecticut Bars. J.D., Columbia University 1990;
B.A., Yale University 1986. The author is the Senior Staff Attorney at Housing
Works, Inc., the largest provider of HIV/AIDS services in the State of New York.
The author wishes to thank Robert Bacigalupi and Kathryn Ottersten for their
invaluable assistance.
1 SHELDON WATTS, EPIDEMICS AND HISTORY xv (1997).
2 HIV is the virus that causes AIDS, the final stage of HIV disease. See LYN R.
FRUMKIN & JOHN M. LEONARD, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON AIDS 1, 4-6 (3d ed.
1997). For a basic introduction to HIV and AIDS, see Armen H. Merjian, AIDS,
Welfare, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
373, 377-79 (1998).
3 Science first identified AIDS in 1981, when the CDC reported the appearance
of a handful of unexplained cases of PCP and Kaposi's sarcoma among gay men in
New York and California. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
Pneumocystic Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY REP.
250 (June 5, 1981); CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Kaposi's
Sarcoma and Pneumocystic Pneumonia Among Homosexual Men-New York City
and California, 30 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY REP. 305 (July 4, 1981). HIV,
the causative agent for AIDS, was not discovered until mid-1984. See RONALD
BAYER, PRIVATE ACTS, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 2 (1991).
4 Susan Sontag has written perhaps the definitive work on the
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transmission were largely misunderstood or unknown, 5 imbued
the disease with the power instantly to stigmatize those living
with the virus.6 By a disastrous twist of fate, moreover, AIDS
disproportionately struck first in communities already laboring
under the weight of society's prejudices: the gay community,
intravenous drug users, and communities of color.7 As one early
commentator explained: "It is one of the cruelest ironies of the
epidemic that its impact is greatest among those already
stigmatized: gay men and intravenous drug users (many of
misidentification of HIV and AIDS as a "plague." See SUSAN SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS
METAPHORS (1989); see also Florence Nightengale Nursing Serv. v. Blue Cross, 832
F. Supp. 1456, 1466 (N.D. Ala. 1993) (calling HIV/AIDS "the AIDS plague"); Corley
v. State, 856 S.W.2d 823, 827 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) ("[Tlhe State had a sound basis to
be concerned about AIDS, called the Black Plague of the 20th Century or the
equivalent of the plague in Europe in the Middle Ages."); THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF
AIDS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (Albert R. Jonsen & Jeff Stryker eds. 1993)
[hereinafter Jonsen & Stryker] ("The AIDS epidemic has invoked comparison with
many epidemics of the past. Most commonly, the bubonic plague (the Black Death)
that devastated Europe in the fourteenth century is recalled.... ."); Howard Means,
Plague Mentality for AIDS, SAN DIEGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 8, 1985, at B7; Jean
Seligmann, et al., The AIDS Epidemic: The Search for a Cure, NEWSWEEK, April 18,
1983, at 74 (noting that AIDS was derisively called "The Gay Plague").
5 For example, in a 1985 New York Times/CBS poll, 47% of those polled
believed that HIV could be transmitted through a shared drinking glass, and 28%
believed that HIV could be picked up from a toilet seat. See Evan Thomas, The New
Untouchables: Anxiety over AIDS Is Verging on Hysteria in Some Parts of the
Country, TIME, Sept. 23, 1985, at 24. A 1988 survey found that 11% of those polled
believed that they could contract the virus from household pets, 8% by shaking
hands, and 21% from a swimming pool. See Rob Stein, AIDS Discrimination
Widespread, U.P.I., Oct. 12, 1988. This ignorance and uncertainty continues. See
infra note 16 and accompanying text; see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AIDS
Coordinating Committee, Calming AIDS Phobia: Legal Implications of the Low Risk
of Transmitting HIV in the Health Care Setting, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 733, 779
(1995) ("AIDS is a disease that spawns public misperception based upon the dearth
of knowledge concerning HIV transmission.").
6 See, e.g., Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 680 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("[T]o conclude
that persons with AIDS are stigmatized is an understatement; they are widely
stereotyped as indelibly miasmic, untouchable, physically and morally polluted.");
Richard Goldstein, AIDS and the Social Construct, TAKING LIBERTIES 88 (Eric
Carter & Simon Watney, eds.-1989) ("HIV invests all its hosts with stigma.").
7 See ROBERT P. GALEA ET AL., AIDS AND IV DRUG USERS xxi (1988) ("In the
beginning, AIDS (originally known as GRID-Gay-Related Immune Disorder) was a
disease of socially outcast groups: homosexual and bisexual men, intravenous (IV)
drug users, and Haitian immigrants. It appeared to be a disease of retribution, a
punishment for behaviors viewed as 'taboo' by mainstream society."); BAYER, supra
note 3, at 72 ("For the first year of the epidemic AIDS remained almost exclusively
a disease of the marginal-gay and bisexual men, intravenous drug users, recent
immigrants from Haiti.").
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whom are black or brown)."8
AIDS thus created, almost overnight, a new class of
individuals subject to widespread and often virulent prejudice
and discrimination:
Since the first cases of AIDS identified in the 1980s were
overwhelmingly among gay men, people of color, and
intravenous drug users, AIDS got off to a bad start. The
bigotry of many people, and even of some religious leaders,
found new opportunities in AIDS issues to fight unpopular
groups. Additionally, when the alarming objective medical
characteristics of AIDS (that it is incurable, fatal, and
transmissible) were thrown into the mix, more people were
swept up in the hostility toward AIDS and toward those it
infected. 9
Individuals living with HIV and AIDS have experienced
discrimination in every facet of life, including such areas as
housing, education, employment, health care, and insurance. 10
8 David I. Schulman, AIDS Discrimination: Its Nature, Meaning and Function,
12 NOVA L. REV. 1113, 1115 (1988); accord Jonsen & Stryker, supra note 4, at 9 ("At
its outset, HIV disease settled among socially disvalued groups, and as the epidemic
has progressed, AIDS has increasingly been an affliction of people who have little
economic, political, and social power. In this sense, AIDS is an undemocratic
affliction."); Goldstein, supra note 6, at 84 ("Many illnesses transform their victims
into a stigmatized class, but AIDS is the first epidemic to take stigmatized classes
and make them victims."); Barry Sullivan, AIDS: Law, Public Policy, and the Work
of the American Bar Association, 21 TOLEDO L. REV. 1, 4 (1989) ("[Tjhe fullest fury
of the HIV epidemic has thus far been felt by communities which already are
targets of distrust or discrimination.").
9 Michael L. Closen, HIV-AIDS in the 1990s, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 239, 240
(1994); see also Allan M. Brandt, AIDS: From Social History to Social Policy, in
AIDS: THE BURDENS OF HISTORY 147, 153 (Elizabeth Fee & Daniel M. Fox eds.,
1988) ("Because of the considerable fear the AIDS epidemic has engendered, and the
fact that the disease has principally affected two already marginal social groups
(gays and- intravenous drug users), its victims have been further victimized by
stigmatization and discrimination.").
10 It is beyond the scope of this Article to review the myriad ways in which
people living with HIV and AIDS have been discriminated against in this country.
See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, EPIDEMIC OF FEAR (1990); NEW YORK
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE
WITH AIDS (1987); Robert J. Blendon & Karen Donelan, Discrimination Against
People with AIDS: The Public's Perspective, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1022 (1988);
Scott Burris, Dental Discrimination Against the HIV-Infected: Empirical Data, Law
and Public Policy, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1996); Closen, supra note 9; Mary C.
Dunlap, AIDS and Discrimination in the United States: Reflections on the Nature of
Prejudice in a Virus, 34 VILL. L. REV. 909 (1989); Lawrence 0. Gostin, The AIDS
Litigation Project: A National Review of Court and Human Rights Commission
Decisions, Part I: The Social Impact of AIDS, 263 JAMA 1961 (1990); Lawrence 0.
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People with AIDS, suspected of having AIDS, and sometimes
even suspected of being at heightened risk for AIDS were fired
from their jobs, denied access to public school classrooms,
deprived of custody and visitation with their children, refused
services of a variety of kinds, derided and defamed throughout
society, and otherwise discriminated against. Violent physical
attacks on people with AIDS including school children, gays,
prisoners, and others were not uncommon.11
Opinion polls have consistently revealed widespread and
profound prejudice against individuals living with HIV and
AIDS. A December 1985 poll taken by the Los Angeles Times
revealed, for example, that "most Americans favor some sort of
legal discrimination against homosexuals as a result of AIDS."12
In that same poll, 51% favored banning people with AIDS from
having sex; 51% favored quarantine for people living with AIDS;
48% wanted people living with AIDS to carry special
identification cards; and 15% favored tattooing people living with
AIDS. 13 In a survey of 53 opinion polls conducted between 1983
and 1988, Harvard School of Public Health researchers reported
that 29% favored tattooing people living with HIV and AIDS;
25% would refuse to work near someone living with AIDS and
believed that employers should have the right to fire someone for
Gostin, The AIDS Litigation Project: A National Review of Court and Human Rights
Commission Decisions, Part II: Discrimination, 263 JAMA 2086 (1990); Katy Chi-
Wen Li, The Private Insurance Industry's Tactics Against Suspected Homosexuals:
Redlining Based on Occupation, Residence and Marital Status, 22 AM. J.L. & MED.
477 (1996).
11 Closen, supra note 9, at 239-40; accord South Fla. Blood Serv. v, Rasmussen,
467 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct. 1985) ("Reported accounts indicate that
victims of AIDS have been faced with social censure, embarrassment and
discrimination in nearly every phase of their lives, including jobs, education and
housing."); Sheila Taub, Doctors, AIDS, and Confidentiality in the 1990s, 27 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 331, 331 (1994) ("Because AIDS made its first appearance
mainly among male homosexuals and intravenous drug abusers, and because the
disease was rapidly and uniformly fatal, persons with AIDS encountered
widespread discrimination in housing, education, employment, medical treatment,
insurance, and other areas."); AFRAIDS: Protecting School Children, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Oct. 14, 1985, at 7 ("The AIDS issue has now spawned a second
epidemic-a wave of hysteria whose symptoms include ostracism, discrimination,
and violence.").
12 E.R. Shipp, Physical Suffering Is Not the Only Pain That AIDS Can Inflict,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1986, at A8. In a Gallup poll taken one month earlier, more
than one-third of Americans said that they "have a less favorable attitude toward
homosexuals because of AIDS." Id.
13 See id.
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this reason alone; and 17% said that those with AIDS should be
treated as those with leprosy once were-by being sent to "far-off
islands. ' 14
Tragically, this ignorance and discrimination continues. In
a recent survey conducted by the Centers for Disease Control,
nearly one in five Americans polled felt that people living with
HIV "have gotten what they deserve."1 5 Forty percent of those
polled believed that HIV transmission could occur through
sharing the same drinking glass and 41% believed that
transmission could occur from being coughed or sneezed on by a
person living with HIV.16
Thus a new civil rights battle-the battle against HIV/AIDS
discrimination-was born of the epidemic, one that would sorely
test the ability of courts to protect the interests of those with
multiple stigmas-including people of color, gay individuals,
prisoners, intravenous drug users, and a combination of one or
more of these categories. 17 Unfortunately, the United States
Supreme Court refused to hear a case involving HIV or AIDS for
more than a decade after the first petition for certiorari in such a
case was filed in 1987.18 Consequently, the Supreme Court did
not decide its first case involving HIV/AIDS until 1998, fully 17
years after AIDS was first identified in this country.' 9 "On more
than twenty-five occasions since 1987," one commentator
explains, "the Supreme Court refused to grant writs of certiorari
in HIV-AIDS cases,"20 doing "absolutely nothing directly to curb
the human rights abuses that have attended the HIV-AIDS
epidemic."21 Additionally, many of the initiatives taken by state
and local authorities are not subject to federal claims, leaving
the rights of those affected to be determined in state court. State
supreme courts have thus served as the ultimate arbiters of the
rights of people living with HIV and AIDS. It appears, however,
14 Stein, supra note 5.
15 47 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1062 (Dec. 1, 2000).
16 Id.
17 See David Schulman, AIDS and Civil Rights, 10 WHITTIER L. REV. 397, 398
(1988) ("AIDS and civil rights interrelate as a new challenge to the old impulses to
stigmatize and victimize.").
18 See Michael L. Closen, The Decade of Supreme Court Avoidance of AIDS:
Denial of Certiorari in HIV-AIDS Cases an Its Adverse Effects on Human Rights, 61
ALB L. REV. 897, 900 (1997-1998).
19 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
20 Closen, supra note 18, at 900-01.
21 Id. at 900.
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that no one has attempted an analysis of state supreme court
jurisprudence regarding HIV and AIDS to determine how this
new class has fared in our courts.
Rather than attempt an unwieldy examination of all 50
state supreme courts, this article examines the jurisprudence of
the court at the epicenter of the AIDS epidemic: the New York
Court of Appeals (the "Court").22 From the beginning of the
AIDS epidemic, New York has led all states with both the
highest number of reported AIDS cases and the highest AIDS
incidence rates.23  New York reported 139,248 AIDS cases
through June 2000, which is more than 19% of the 728,694 AIDS
cases confirmed in the United States from the inception of the
epidemic.24
This Article concludes that, with some notable exceptions,
the Court has failed to exercise the careful scrutiny that this new
struggle demands, with some regrettable consequences. The
discussion reveals, for example, that the Court upheld a decision
denying prisoners with HIV the right to visit not only with
spouses but also with parents or siblings, despite common
medical knowledge at the time that HIV could not be spread
through casual contact. 25  Further, the Court accepted
unfounded contentions that failure to impose HIV tests would
bankrupt the insurance industry, notwithstanding contemporary
wisdom that HIV would not bankrupt the insurance industry,
and that HIV could not be distinguished in a principled manner
22 See BAYER, supra note 3, at 104-05 ("N.Y., the epicenter of the American
AIDS epidemic .... ); AIDS Grant Program Initiated, AIDS WKLY, March 6, 2000
("In the U.S., New York City is considered to be the epicenter of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic ....").
23 See, e.g., CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report,
AIDS Cases and Annual Rates per 100,000 Population, by Area and Age Group,
Reported Through June 2000, United States, (Dec. 27, 2000), available at
<www.cdc.gov/hiv/stats/hasrl20l/table2.htm> [hereinafter Surveillance Report].
This was also the case, for example, when the Court heard its first case in 1987. See
Jo-Ann Moriarty, Untitled, STATES NEW SERVICE, June 5, 1987 ("New York and
California currently lead the country with the greatest number of reported AIDS
cases, with numbers at 10,726 and 8,027 logged since June 1, 1981 ....").
24 See Surveillance Report, supra note 23 (showing New York State with the
leading number of cases and the highest annual rates); see also STATE OF NEW
YORK, DEPT OF HEALTH, AIDS IN NEW YORK STATE 56 (1998-99) ("More than
122,500 AIDS cases were confirmed in New York State through the end of 1997.
New York State continues to lead the country in annual and cumulative AIDS
incidence; cases diagnosed in New York State accounted for more than 19 percent of
the 641,086 AIDS cases confirmed in the United States through December 1997.").
25 See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
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from equally expensive conditions for which no test was
imposed.26
The Court has also been greatly inconsistent in its deference
to State authorities dealing with HIV and AIDS. In Doe v.
Coughlin,27 for example, the Court showed great deference to
prison authorities ostensibly acting to protect the public health
of the nonprison community, a matter outside of their area of
expertise and authority.28 In Health Insurance Ass'n. of America
v. Corcoran,29 by contrast, the Court refused to defer to both the
Superintendent of Insurance and the Commissioner of Health on
matters squarely within their areas of expertise and authority,
even accusing them, without support, of effecting their own
personal objectives in implementing non-coercive measures to
combat the spread of HIV.30  One year later, the Court
unanimously upheld the Commissioner of Health's decision to
implement virtually the same non-coercive measures, failing to
distinguish or even discuss its pribr ruling.31
There have been some good decisions, including the Court's
most recent in Hernandez v. Barrios-Paoli.32 As the discussion
reveals, however, these have been sandwiched between poor,
even dreadful decisions, from Doe in 1987 to Mixon v. Grinker33
in 1996. All told, this Article reveals a disturbing failure to
scrutinize sweeping assertions of necessity in the face of crisis.
In particular, this Article reveals a failure to firmly protect the
civil rights and civil liberties of multiple-stigmatized individuals
against the unfounded claims of public officials, who shroud
their actions in the garb of official sanction. 34 It is precisely at
26 See infra notes 170-91 and accompanying text.
27 518 N.E.2d 536 (N.Y. 1987).
28 See infra, notes 77-96 and accompanying text.
29 565 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1990).
30 See infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
31 See N.Y. State Soc'y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605 (N.Y. 1991); see
also infra notes 227-70 and accompanying text.
32 720 N.E.2d 866 (N.Y. 1999) (holding that eligibility verification review
cannot be part of the required process to determine eligibility for the Division of
AIDS Services and Income Support).
33 669 N.E.2d 819 (N.Y. 1996) (holding that HIV infected homeless are not
constitutionally or statutorily entitled to medically appropriate housing).
34 If nothing else, the AIDS crisis has revealed the inherent fallibility of public
officials, whose proposals for dealing with the HIV epidemic have ranged from the
ill-conceived to the downright invidious. In 1987, for example, the year that the
Supreme Court first denied certiorari in a case involving HIV/AIDS, and the year of
the New York Court of Appeals' first decision on HIV/AIDS, Senator Jesse Helms
2002]
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times of crisis that the fairness of our judicial system is tested.
As Justice Marshall warned: "History teaches that grave threats
to liberty often come in time of urgency, when constitutional
rights seem too extravagant to endure."35 The Court at the
epicenter of the AIDS crisis, has fared poorly on this test.
This Article examines a total of eight cases involving HIV
and AIDS in chronological order.36  Each of these cases is
assessed in the context in which it was decided, i.e., utilizing
medical and public health information available to the Court at
the time of the decision. In addition, wherever possible, the
cases are compared and contrasted to identify consistencies or
inconsistencies in the Court's reasoning. A brief conclusion
follows.
I. DOE V. COUGHLIN(1987)
A. Background
Appellants John and Jane Doe were married in June of
1985. At the time, John Doe was an inmate at the Auburn
Correctional Facility serving a sentence of 5.5 to 11 years.37 In
October of 1985, Mr. Doe qualified for the prison's Family
Reunion Program (the "Program"), and the Does were granted a
two-day conjugal visit in a trailer located on prison grounds. 38
proposed on CBS' Face the Nation, that everyone living with HIV and AIDS be
quarantined. See David Kirp, Politicization of AIDS Is Outrageous, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, June 19, 1987, at B-11. President Ronald Reagan supported a
proposal for mandatory HIV testing of all marriage applicants. See James Gerstenz
and David Lauter, AIDS Marriage Test Debate Widens; President May Support
Proposal but Issue Divides GOP, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1987, at A5. United States
Attorney General Edwin Meese proposed that some prisoners carrying the HIV
virus should not be paroled like other prisoners. See Robert Pear, AIDS Tests
Ordered for U.S. Prisoners and Immigration; Meese Details Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June
9, 1987, at Al. New York City Mayor Edward Koch proposed that immigrants,
tourists, and business travelers coming to New York be tested for HIV. See George
James, Testing Tourists for AIDS Is Urged, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1987, at B8.
35 Skinner v. Ry Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
36 Although HIV and AIDS played a part in other cases reaching the Court,
these eight have been selected because of the centrality of HIV and AIDS to the
decisions.
37 See Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536, 537-538 (N.Y. 1987).
38 The Program permitted selected inmates to spend a period of days with their
spouses and certain relatives in a private trailer located on the prison complex. The
stated purpose of the Program was to "preserve, enhance and strengthen family ties
that have been disrupted as a result of incarceration," in order to help inmates
[Vol.76:115
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Participation in the Program was governed by regulations issued
by the New York State Department of Correctional Services.
These regulations established a list of 15 factors to be considered
in determining whether to grant a prisoner access to the
Program, including whether the prisoner had received a
"diagnosis as having a communicable disease."39
In December of 1985, Mr. Doe was diagnosed with AIDS,
and respondents, various corrections officials ("Respondents"),
denied the Does any further conjugal visits on the grounds that
Mr. Doe had been diagnosed "as having a communicable
disease."40 The Does then filed suit alleging, inter alia, that
Respondents' decision to revoke their right to conjugal visits
violated their state and federal constitutional rights.41 In a 4-3
decision written by Judge Simons, a plurality affirmed the lower
court rulings dismissing the Does' petition. The decision was
extremely close, however, with Judges Bellacosa and Wachtler
issuing concurrences and Judges Alexander, Hancock, Jr., and
Kaye, issuing a forceful dissent.42
B. The Decision
The Does advanced two independent constitutional claims:
violation of their right to privacy and violation of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Examining
adjust to society after their release from prison. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
7, § 220.1 (1995).
39 Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d at 541 n.1 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7,
§220.3 (a)-(c) (1995)). The fifteen factors are the prisoner's (1) length of time in
incarceration; (2) degree of institutional adjustment; (3) eligibility for temporary
release; (4) security classification; (5) assignment to a special housing unit; (6)
pattern of disruptive behavior; (7) prior violations of Family Reunion Program
regulations; (8) designation as a central monitoring case; (9) outstanding warrants;
(10) nature of conviction; (11) parole violation status; (12) protective custody status;
(13) participation in some other special program; (14) assignment to a mental
hygiene unit; and (15) diagnosis as having a communicable disease. See id.
40 Id. at 538.
41 The Does also alleged that Respondents' decision was arbitrary and
capricious, and unlawfully discriminated against Mr. Doe on the basis of his
disability, in violation of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973. For the sake of
brevity, this Article examines only the Does' constitutional claims.
42 The New York Law Journal noted that the case "produced a highly unusual
division of the court, which [had] been unanimous in more than 90% of the cases
decided by it in the last two years." E.J. McMahon, Ban Upheld on Conjugal Visits
to State Prisoners with AIDS, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 25, 1987, at 1, col. 3.; accord Jeffrey
Schmalz, New York Court Upholds Conjugal-Visit Ban for Inmate with AIDS, N. Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 1987, at BlI ("The court was unusually sharply divided.").
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each of these claims in turn, Judge Simons first noted that
although "[a]n individual does not automatically forfeit all
constitutional rights upon conviction of a crime,"43 he does lose
his liberty upon imprisonment, and '"is rights are necessarily
limited by the realities of confinement and by the legitimate
goals and policies of the correctional system."44 In particular,
courts have uniformly held that neither a prisoner nor his spouse
has a right to conjugal relations or visitation. 45 Accordingly,
Judge Simons concluded, the Does' privacy claim must fail, for,
"although prisoners retain some rights to privacy, the right to
conjugal relations has not been included among them."46
Judge Simons' conceptualization of the Does' privacy claim
as a claim for the right to conjugal visitation or relations was
critical to his perfunctory rejection of their claim. If, as Judge
Simons saw it, the Does were seeking to establish a right to
conjugal visitation, their claim must fail, because courts had
consistently refused to establish such a right. Notably, however,
the majority of judges disagreed with this limited
conceptualization. Both of the concurrences and the dissent-a
total of five judges-recognized that far more was at stake than
the right to conjugal visitation. !
Indeed, contrary to Judge Simons' characterization, the
general right to conjugal visitation was never at issue in Doe. As
the dissent explained, "Petitioners neither assert that
respondent is required to establish a conjugal visitation
program, nor do they argue that respondent must affirmatively
provide all inmates access to the Family Reunion Program at
facilities where it is instituted."47 Rather, the Does claimed that
Respondents' decision was based exclusively upon the concern
that the Does would engage in sexual relations, thus implicating
a more fundamental marital right. "[Ilt must be recognized,"
Judge Wachtler explained in his concurrence, "that the decision
at issue here was not based, for example, upon the
Commissioner's dispassionate assessment of the extent of prison
resources. Instead, his decision'was based upon a calculated risk
43 Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d at 539.
4 Id. ("[Ain inmate retains only those rights which 'are not inconsistent with
his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the
correctional system.' ").
45 See id. at 540.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 548.
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that, if left alone, the inmate and his wife as a married couple
would engage in sexual relations."48 What was at stake, then,
was not the right to conjugal visitation, but the right of married
couples to engage in sexual relations. Both the concurrences and
the dissent emphasized this point.49
Addressing both the concurrences and the dissent, Judge
Simons responded that, "rather than restrict a right,
[Respondents] regulated a benefit available to those qualified."50
This is, however, tautologous: it was Respondents' determination
that the Does were not qualified for the Program that required
closer scrutiny, and it required such scrutiny because it directly
implicated the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right, not
merely a request for a "benefit." The Does argued that they
were, in fact, qualified, and that Respondents' determination
that they were not qualified was constitutionally insufficient.
The implication that the Does were not "qualified" for the
"benefit," then, was doubly misleading.
Judge Simons' rejection of the Does' privacy claim led,
inevitably, to his rejection of their equal protection claim. If, as
Judge Simons found, the Does' claim did not implicate
fundamental constitutional rights, then Respondents' decision
needed only to survive a rational basis test. "Because the
entitlement of selected inmates to conjugal visits is not a matter
of constitutional right," Judge Simons explained, "petitioners'
equal protection claim must be rejected if the Correction
Department's ruling bears a rational relationship to a legitimate
48 Id. at 545. The dissent similarly observed that the Does were denied the
benefits of the Program "solely because of the manner in which they may choose to
exercise their marital right." Id. at 549; accord id. at 546 (identifying basis of
Commissioner's decision "to shield petitioner wife from infection should the two
decide to engage in sexual relations").
49 Although a prisoner may have no liberty interest in participating in the
Program, Judge Wachtler observed, "[A] higher standard of scrutiny is required
because the decision to disallow participation is based upon how the inmate will
exercise other, constitutionally protected rights." Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d at 545
(Wachtler, J., concurring). Judge Bellacosa agreed with Judge Wachtler, expressly
acknowledging the existence of "other facets of inmates' rights to privacy which
might implicate fundamental constitutional protections." Id. at 544 (Bellacosa, J.,
concurring). Similarly, Judge Alexander observed that "Ithe basis for this
determination, in effect, invades a part of the fundamental marital right-the area
of personal intimate decision-making between husband and wife-that survives
incarceration." Id. at 549 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 543 (emphasis added).
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State purpose. '51 Once again, Judge Simons simply ignored the
judgment of the majority of justices that the gravamen of the
Does' privacy claim was not entitlement to conjugal visitation
but the fundamental constitutional right to marital intimacy.52
Applying the rational basis test, Judge Simons first
underscored "the recognized danger of AIDS."53 He then noted
that the New York Correction Law expressly directs that
Respondents give "due regard to... the safety and security of
the community."54 Citing no authority, Judge Simons explained
that "[plreventing the spread of communicable diseases to those
outside the prison comes within the statutory direction."55 Given
the recognized danger of AIDS, and "the fact that respondents
cannot guarantee the disease would not be spread to a
nonprisoner if petitioners are afforded conjugal visits," Judge
Simons concluded that Respondents had a rational basis for
excluding the Does from the Program.56 That the Does might
abstain from having sex, or that they might reduce the danger of
transmission through safe sexual practices, did not alter this
conclusion. "The possibility remains that permitting petitioners'
participation in the conjugal visit program may result in the
spread of a serious communicable disease."57
The question of harm to members of the prison community
was never at issue in Doe. Likewise, the potential spread of the
HIV virus to Mrs. Doe was irrelevant to Judge Simon's
decision.58 The decision was based solely upon the threat posed
to the "community" outside of the prison. In a footnote, Judge
Simons explained the basis of this threat.59  Mrs. Doe could
possibly contract the HIV virus from Mr. Doe during a conjugal
visit. Subsequently, "Jane Doe may become pregnant and
transmit the disease to her child or... she may become single in
the future, either by divorce or widowhood."60 Accordingly,
51 Id. at 542.
52 See discussion supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
53 Id. at 542.
54 Id. at 543 (quoting N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 70(2)(a) (McKinney 1987)).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 542.
57 Id.
58 Judge Simons was careful to note that Respondents' decision was not based
upon the risk of harm to Ms. Doe. See id. at 542 n.3 ("[Rlespondents' concern
manifestly extends beyond assumption of the risk involved to her personally.").
59 See id.
60 Id.
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Judge Simons explained, Respondents' decision "bore a rational
relationship to the proper and successful operation of the
program and particularly to the spread of communicable
diseases to nonprisoners."61 To buttress his argument, Judge
Simons added that "[the courts traditionally have deferred to
the discretion of correction officials on matters relating to the
administration of prison facilities and rehabilitation programs." 62
There are two critical problems with the plurality's decision,
both of which bespeak an unwillingness to carefully scrutinize
the actions of public officials in responding to this new and
misunderstood "plague."63 First, Judge Simons applied the
wrong test-minimal, "rational basis" scrutiny-to the Does'
equal protection claim.64 Accordingly, Judge Simons failed to
closely examine the extremely tenuous and speculative grounds
upon which Respondents based their decision to exclude the
Does. Second, and relatedly, Judge Simons accorded great
deference to correction officials with regard to a matter not
within the officials' area of superior knowledge and expertise.
This undue deference led the plurality blindly to accept
Respondents' argument that their decision was justified by the
statutory obligation to consider "the safety and security of the
community" outside of the prison. Each of these problems is
addressed below.
In Turner v. Safley,6 5 the Supreme Court articulated the
standard by which constitutional challenges to prison
restrictions should be judged. The Supreme Court ruled that
"when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional
61 Id. at 544.
62 Id. at 543.
63 See supra note 4.
r The majority of judges actually argued for a more heightened scrutiny to be
applied to the Does' constitutional claims than the rational basis test that Judge
Simons applied. See id. at 544 (Bellacosa, J., concurring) ("[A] higher test than
rational basis would be necessary to pass constitutional challenge .... "); see id. at
545 (Wachtler, J., concurring) ("[A] higher standard of scrutiny is required because
the decision to disallow participation is based upon how the inmate will exercise
other, constitutionally protected rights."); see id. at 546 (Alexander, J., dissenting)
("[A] higher level of scrutiny is required .... "); see also Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 711
F. Supp. 83, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 871 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Although the
plurality found that the inmate had no constitutional right to marital privacy, a
majority of the court, including Chief Judge Wachtler in his concurring opinion,
concluded that such a right existed and that its infringement should be subject to a
heightened level of scrutiny.") (citation omitted).
65 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
20021
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests."66  As Judge Alexander
explained, although this standard does not compel strict scrutiny
of the regulation,67 "neither is it satisfied upon the finding of a
mere 'rational basis' related to a general interest."68 Under both
the federal and state constitutions, what is "central" to the
court's approach, "is a weighing or balancing of the nature and
importance of the right asserted against the purposes advanced
for the prison regulation or practice. And, critical to either
analysis is that the interest advanced by the prison relate to the
purposes or administration of correction facilities."69
Judge Simons never weighed the rights of the Does against
the purposes advanced by Respondents, and his application of
the rational basis test precluded any searching inquiry into the
legitimacy of the authorities' ostensible justification. In fact, as
we shall discuss, matters concerning the health of the
nonprisoner community were not within the discretionary
powers of Respondents. 70 Not only was the basis of Respondents'
authority tenuous, but the decision itself was based entirely
upon a highly speculative potential threat:
Any connection between respondent's policy and the asserted
interest.., is tenuous. Respondent's determination, at bottom,
is based on a series of speculations and unwarranted
66 Id. at 89; accord O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350 (1987)
("First, a regulation must have a logical connection to legitimate governmental
interests invoked to justify it.").
67 For the argument that the Doe Court should have applied strict scrutiny to
the Does' claim, see Simeon Goldstein, Note, Prisoners with AIDS: Constitutional
and Statutory Rights Implicated in Family Visitation Programs, 31 B.C. L. REV.
967, 1008 (1990) ("The Doe court should have employed strict scrutiny as the
standard of review for conjugal visit regulations."). For the argument that courts
should apply a more demanding standard than the rational basis test to cases
involving HIV, see Sean Doyle, Note, HIV-Positive, Equal Protection Negative, 81
GEO. L.J. 375 (1992). Doyle urges courts to closely "examine the medical reality
behind the policymaker's assertions to expose what motivated their choice of
means." Id. at 407.
68 Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d at 549 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
69 See id. at 550. Again both Judge Wachtler and Judge Bellacosa, in their
concurrences, agreed that the higher standard should have been applied. Both were
persuaded, however, that the authorities met this higher standard. See id. at 544
(Bellacosa, J., concurring); Id. at 545 (Wachtler, J., concurring) ("I agree with the
result reached by the plurality, however, because I believe that under the higher
scrutiny required by the implication of a constitutional right the Commissioner's
decision has a sufficient basis.") (citations omitted).
70 See discussion infra notes 76-96 and accompanying text.
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presumptions: that petitioners necessarily will use their private
time together to engage in sexual relations, that they
necessarily will disregard the advice of their professional health
care counselors and not employ "safe sex" techniques, that
petitioner wife necessarily will contract AIDS from her
husband, and that petitioner wife necessarily will engage in
adulterous sexual activities with others-without the use of
prophylactics-and thereby transmit the virus to the
population at large.7 1
Responding to this assertion, Judge Simons noted that Ms.
Doe could also transmit the virus to her child through pregnancy
or she could become single in the future, "either by divorce or
widowhood."72 Judge Simons' additional hypotheticals, however,
made the plurality's decision no less tenuous.
First, with respect to potential perinatal transmission, the
decision was still based upon the assumptions articulated by the
dissent, and, in addition, the assumption that the virus would be
transmitted to the fetus, 73 and that the* as yet unconceived fetus
was a member of the "community." This last point, never raised
by the dissent, is perhaps the most important of all.
Respondents' justification for precluding the Does from the
Program was based entirely upon the statutory requirement that
Respondents give due regard to the "community."74 Arguably,
however, an as yet unconceived fetus is not part of the
"community" and thus beyond the purview of Respondents'
statutory authority or discretion.7 5
71 Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d at 551 (Alexander, J., dissenting); see also Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 101 n. 1 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (warning that the majority's "rather open-ended 'reasonableness' standard
makes it much too easy to uphold restrictions on prisoners' First Amendment rights
on the basis of administrative concerns and speculation about possible security risks
rather than on the basis of evidence that the restrictions are needed to further an
important governmental interest.") (emphasis added).
72 Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d at 542 n.3.
73 Perinatal transmission is by no means certain. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbot,
524 U.S. 624, 640 (1998) ("Petitioner concedes that women infected with HIV face
about a 25% risk of transmitting the virus to their children. Published reports
available in 1994 confirm the accuracy of this statistic.") (citations omitted);
Leonardo Renna, Note, New York State's Proposal to Unblind HIV Testing for
Newborns: A Necessary Step in Addressing a Critical Problem, 60 BROOK. L. REv.
407, 412 (1994) ("Studies have shown that the rate of perinatal transmission is
approximately one-in-three, with estimates ranging from 15 to 39%.").
74 See discussion supra note 54 and accompanying text.
75 Because abortion is a legal option in this country, moreover, Respondent's
decision must also have been based upon the assumption that the Does would
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Second, with respect to Ms. Doe's potentially becoming
single in the future, the decision was likewise based upon the
assumptions articulated by the dissent, and, in addition, the
following assumptions: that after contracting the virus, Ms. Doe
would divorce Mr. Doe or become widowed; that Ms. Doe would
then engage in unprotected sex with another person; and that
the third party would thereby contract the virus from Ms. Doe.76
Judge Simons not only utilized an insufficient test in
examining the "State purpose" of excluding the Does, but he
erroneously deemed that purpose "penological":
The establishment of such [conjugal visitation] programs comes
within the authority delegated to correction officials to exercise
general responsibility for care and confinement of criminals and
for instituting programs for their treatment and rehabilitation.
The fulfillment of those penological objectives requires
administrative regulations consistent not only with the safety
and health of those within the prison facility, but also with the
safety of society generally.77
Judge Simons was correct in observing that the
establishment of visitation programs comes "within the
authority delegated to correction officials to exercise general
responsibility for care and confinement of criminals and for
instituting programs for their treatment and rehabilitation."78
He then, however, baldly linked these "penological objectives"
with the discretionary authority to protect "the safety of society
generally. "79
proceed with the pregnancy and conceive another member of the community. See
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
76 There is, of course, a further assumption built in to this hypothetical: that
Ms. Doe, upon becoming single, would continue to reside in the "community," and
that the third party to whom she passed the virus would also reside in the
'community." Under the plain meaning of the statute, Respondents are not cloaked
with the authority to consider the safety of the entire country, or the world, for that
matter. Rather, if the safety of those outside of the prison community fall within
this term at all, it must refer merely to those in the community surrounding the
prison. Arguably, then, if Ms. Doe moved to Florida following her divorce of Mr. Doe,
her actions would be beyond the discretionary consideration of Respondents.
77 Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d at 543; see also id. at 543 (Inmates "forfeit this right
[to privacy] upon incarceration for the most basic and legitimate penological
reasons, punishment, security and deterrence.") (emphasis added).
78 Id. at 543.
79 Id.; see also Goldstein, supra note 67, at 1008 ("[P]rison regulations should
address matters of institutional security, not public health, particularly when
statutory references to community safety and security have focused on the escape or
presence of dangerous criminals, not the containment of sexually transmitted
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Judge Simons simply did not, and could not, demonstrate
how the safety of society generally falls within the traditional
responsibilities for the "care and confinement of criminals" or for
"their treatment and rehabilitation."80 As Judge Alexander ably
pointed out: "Respondent does not articulate any concern for
institutional security, does not identify any interest in the safety
of petitioner husband or the prison employees, and does not
advance a single interest that would further a penological
purpose or facilitate prison administration."8 1
The traditional justification for the Court's exercise of
judicial restraint in prison cases was plainly lacking in Doe. In a
series of prison cases preceding Doe, the United States Supreme
Court explained the rationale for exercising judicial restraint
when reviewing prison regulations and policies, and,
concomitantly, for according deference to the decisions and
judgments of prison authorities. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 2 the
Court explained that "internal problems of state prisons involve
issues ... peculiarly within the state authority and expertise."8 3
One year later, in Procunier v. Martinez,8 4 the Court announced
that "courts are ill-equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent
problems of prison administration and reform."8 5 In Block v.
Rutherford,8 6 the Court "refused to "substitute our judgment
on... difficult and sensitive matters of institutional
administration."87 Finally, in Turner v. Safely, decided just
months before Doe, the Court announced: "Prison administration
diseases.").
80 Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d at 543.
81 Id. at 551 (Alexander, J., dissenting). Judge Alexander reiterated this point
throughout the dissent: "Respondent has not shown how its policy bears any
relationship to the traditional purposes of incarceration, or how it addresses
concerns for institutional security and administration." Id. at 551 (Alexander, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 546 (Alexander, J., dissenting) ("[R]espondent advances
neither an institutional concern nor a penological purpose in support of his
determination."); id. at 551 (Alexander, J., dissenting) ("Respondent's determination
has no impact on the prison community. The asserted interest is not a penological
one."); id. at 554 (Alexander, J., dissenting) ("[Riespondent has not proffered an
institutional or penological purpose for classifying petitioner husband differently.").
82 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
83 Id. at 492.
84 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
85 Id. at 405; see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) (noting the
"measure of judicial deference owed to correction officials").
86 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
87 Id. at 588.
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is... a task that has been committed to the responsibility of
those [executive and legislative branches], and separation of
powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint."88
The public health matter at issue in Doe, by contrast, was
not an "internal problem[] of state prisons";8 9 it did not "involve
issues.., peculiarly within the state authority and expertise";90
and it did not involve "prison administration and reform" 91 or
"institutional administration."92  Most important of all,
protecting against a potential threat to public health was not "a
task.., committed to the responsibility of [Respondents]. 93 As
the dissent pointed out, "[T]he Legislature has not delegated to
the Department of Correctional Services the authority to
regulate in matters relating to public health."94 That authority
was delegated to the Public Health Council. 95 Accordingly, the
plurality in Doe should not have deferred to Respondents in an
area that they were ill-equipped to handle. 96
In fact, Respondents' actions evidenced a disturbing lack of
expertise and sensitivity in handling the public health matter at
issue. For example, after Mr. Doe was diagnosed with AIDS,
Mrs. Doe was forced to visit him in the prison hospital, under
deplorable conditions. Mr. Doe was forced to sit in a chair in the
doorway of the hospital's isolation room while Mrs. Doe was
forced to sit in the hospital's main corridor, "with a table placed
between them and a correction officer in close proximity."97 The
Does were thus denied not only sexual intimacy, but also any
privacy or human contact, forced to endure a dehumanizing and
wholly unnecessary separation during their visits. Indeed, even
at the time of Respondents' decision, it was known that the HIV
virus could not be spread through casual contact. 98 A similar
88 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987).
89 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973).
90 Id.
91 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974).
92 Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588 (1984).
93 Turner, 482 U.S. at 85.
94 Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536, 553 (N.Y. 1987) (Alexander, J., dissenting).
95 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 225 (McKinney 1990).
96 See Goldstein, supra note 67, at 1024 ("When such officials act outside the
realm of their expertise and knowledge, traditional judicial deference is no longer
appropriate.").
97 Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d at 550 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
98 Judge Alexander noted that Mr. Doe could not transmit the virus to other
family members "according to the medical evidence in the record." Doe, 518 N.E.2d
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ignorance and insensitivity lead Respondents to deny Mr. Doe's
petition to visit privately with other family members as
permitted under the Program. 99  There was simply no
penological basis, 100 and certainly no medical basis, for this
decision.101
Finally, the decision to deny the Does the right to
participate was itself medically unsound. As both the New York
at 552 (Alexander, J., dissenting). As early as 1985, moreover, the Surgeon General
of the United States issued a report in which he concluded that the H1V virus could
not be spread through casual contact. See U.S. DEP' OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFINCIENCY
SYNDROME 21 (1985) ("AIDS is an infectious disease. It is contagious, but it cannot
be spread in the same manner as a common cold or measles or chicken pox....
AIDS is not spread by common everyday contact but by sexual contact ... ."). This
fact was well documented in the legal commentaries of the time. See, e.g., Evelyn M.
Gentlemann, After School Board of Nassau County v. Arline: Employees with AIDS
and the Concerns of the "Worried Well," 37 AM. U. L. REV. 867, 869 (1987) ("Despite
the overwhelming scientific evidence which demonstrates that AIDS is not
transmitted by casual social or physical contact, persons with AIDS continue to face
discrimination."); Deborah Jones Merritt, Communicable Disease and Constitutional
Law: Controlling AIDS, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 739, 751 (1986); Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS
and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 85
(1985) ("Because casual contact cannot spread the disease, infected individuals
present no health hazard to anyone with whom they do not have sexual relations,
exchange of blood or other bodily fluids, or share intravenous needles."). Ironically,
Commissioner Coughlin himself observed, less than one year after Doe, that "the
virus is not passed through any form of casual contact." Thomas A. Coughlin III,
AIDS in Prisons: One Correctional Administrator's Recommended Policies and
Procedures, 72 JUDICATURE 63 (June-July 1988).
99 See Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d at 551 (Alexander, J., dissenting). Respondents'
decision to bar visits even with other family members was quite significant, since
the majority, or 60% of family reunion visits under the Program were with parents
or siblings. See McMahon, supra note 42.
100 In Turner v. Safely, the Supreme Court explained that courts should
consider the impact that accommodating the inmate's request would have "on
guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally." 482
U.S. 78, 90 (1987); accord O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). The
Supreme Court explained that "[wihen accommodation of an asserted right will
have a significant 'ripple effect' on fellow inmates or prison staff, courts should be
particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections officials." 482 U.S.
at 90. The decision to accommodate Mr. Doe would not have taxed prison resources
or otherwise negatively affected other inmates or on prison guards. If anything,
Respondents' decision to preclude the Does would have the "ripple effect" of
deterring other inmates from taking an HIV test, thereby increasing the likelihood
of transmission through conjugal visits with untested inmates living with HIV. See
discussion infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
101 See Goldstein, supra note 67, at 1010-11 ("Given that family members were
at no risk of contracting the virus through casual contact with their AIDS-infected
relative, the prohibition of conjugal visits by prison officials was merely a pretext for
discriminating against John Doe.").
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State Commissioner of Health and the State Superintendent of
Insurance knew, 10 2 and, ironically, as the New York Court of
Appeals would affirm four years after Doe, 10 3  penalizing
individuals who test positive for the HIV virus serves as a strong
deterrent to testing. 0 4 If individuals do not test for HIV, they
cannot learn of their status, leading to the unwitting spread of
the disease from untested individuals to their spouses. 105 This
may well have happened in New York. In reversing the ill-
conceived policy four years after Doe, Commissioner Coughlin
himself acknowledged that Respondents' policy had served as a
strong deterrent to HIV testing among married prisoners.
"[Commissioner Coughlin] said he believed that several
thousand married prisoners had been refusing to take the test in
recent years for fear that a positive result could cut them off
102 See Doe v. Coughlin, 509 N.Y.S.2d 209, 211 (3d Dep't 1986) ("Petitioners
challenge respondents' findings that AIDS is a communicable disease on the ground
that the Department of Health, which has the expertise in matters of disease
classification while the Department of Correctional Services does not, has not
classified AIDS as a communicable disease, but, rather, as a 'reportable' disease.")
(citation omitted).
103 See discussion infra notes 227-70 and accompanying text.
104 Three years after Doe, the New York State AIDS Advisory Council's Ad Hoc
Committee on AIDS in Correctional Facilities would recommend allowing conjugal
visits based upon this very principle: "Prohibiting conjugal and family visits is a
counter-productive policy because it will discourage prisoner from being tested for
HIV infection.... Discriminating against those who acquire knowledge about their
HIV status is a chilling punishment for decent and responsible behavior." Nancy
Neveloff Dubler et al., Management of HIV Infection in New York State Prisons, 21
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 363, 398 (1990).
105 "Because [New York] state law forbids mandatory testing for AIDS, the
state has had no way of baring visits from spouses of untested prisoners even if
those prisoners do have the disease." Sam Howe Verhovek, Spouse Visits for
Inmates with HV, N.Y. TIMES, August 5, 1991, at B1. According to an official prison
estimate, in 1991, about 8,500, or 15% of the State's prisoners were believed to be
living with HIV, but because most inmates refused testing, "only about 2,500 [were]
known by the state to have the virus." Id. In Bullock v. Gomez, 929 F. Supp. 1299
(C.D. Cal. 1996), a California district court examined a similar challenge to
California's prohibition of spousal conjugal visits for prisoners living with HIV. In
denying defendants' summary judgment motion, the court rejected defendants'
argument that their policy was based upon legitimate penological concerns. Among
other things, the court questioned whether the policy was crafted to prevent the
transmission of HIV considering the fact that, without mandatory testing in the
prison, "[oinly one-third of the inmates estimated to be HIV positive are identified
as such," and that "it is general knowledge that unidentified HIV positive inmates
use the overnight visiting areas for conjugal visits." Id. at 1307. The court cited
expert testimony indicating that "one of the reasons that a significant number of
HIV positive prisoners have not tested for HIV is that there are disincentives, the
prohibition on conjugal visits being one such disincentive." Id. (citations omitted).
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from visits with their spouses.' 10 6
The great irony, or tragedy, of the decision to uphold
Respondents' policy is that it was far more likely to result in the
spread of the HIV virus in the "community," by unwitting,
untested individuals, than permitting conjugal visits among
individuals living with HIV who had received safe sex
counseling, such as the Does. 10 7 This was the price of deferring
to authorities who lacked the expertise to draft policies best-
suited to protect the public health of the community. 08 As we
shall see, public health authorities, in stark contrast,
intentionally eschewed adopting measures that would deter
testing among individuals at risk of contracting HIV illness. 109 If
the plurality had not been so intent on blindly adhering to the
106 Verhovek, supra note 105.
107 For an alternative public health argument in favor of permitting prisoners
living with HIV to participate in conjugal visits, see Thomas M. Bates, Rethinking
Conjugal Visitation in Light of the 'AIDS' Crisis, 15 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT, 121-45 (1989). Bates argues that conjugal visits reduce gay sexual
activity in prison, thereby reducing the spread of the virus. See Victoria P. Pappas,
Note, In Prison with AIDS: The Constitutionality of Mass Screening and Segregation
Policies, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 172 n.177 (1988) ("Still other correctional experts
recommend allowing inmates conjugal visits as a step toward reducing the spread of
AIDS. These experts believe such visits would serve to satisfy inmates' sexual
needs, thus decreasing inmates' desires to engage in consensual and/or
nonconsensual homosexual relations.").
108 One of the factors that the Supreme Court determined to be relevant in
determining the reasonableness of a prison regulation or decision is the presence or
absence of "ready alternatives." Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987). The
existence of alternatives, the Court has held, "may be evidence that the regulation is
not reasonable, but is an 'exaggerated response' to prison concerns." Id.; accord Pell
v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974). Hence, "ifan inmate claimant can point to an
alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid
penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does
not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard." Turner, 482 U.S. at 91.
Respondents' decision in Doe was an "exaggerated response" to the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. The greatest evidence of this is, of course, Respondents' subsequent
decision to reverse themselves and allow for conjugal visits provided that the
couples receive [counseling on safe sex techniques]. See supra note 107 and
accompanying text. This alternative carried no "cost to valid penological interests"
and was actually an epidemiologically preferable alternative. Turner, 482 U.S. at
91. The manner in which the Does were forced to conduct their hospital visits, and
Respondents' decision to deny even other family members the right to visit privately
with Mr. Doe, certainly underscore the exaggerated nature of Respondents'
response. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that at the time, Connecticut officials
permitted inmates living with HIV to participate in conjugal visits provided that
they and their families first met with the prison's medical director to discuss the
risks of transmission. See Goldstein, supra note 67, at 994 n.239.
109 See infra notes 257-64 and accompanying text.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
principle of judicial restraint, in an area where it was wholly
unwarranted, they might have agreed with the dissent that
Respondents' decision was "unjustifiable,"110  and certainly
insufficient to trump the Does' fundamental constitutional
rights. Instead, prisoners living with HIV and their families
were forced to wait four more years until Respondents
themselves acknowledged, and reversed, the error of their ways.
II. WARE v. VALLEY STREAM HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT
(1989)
Above all else, Ware v. Valley Stream High School District"'
is a First Amendment decision, and an unusual one at that.
Nonetheless, the regulations in question were promulgated to
control the spread of HIV/AIDS, a recurrent theme in several of
the Court's decisions regarding HI-V/AIDS. The Court's
treatment of the issue thus warrants a brief examination.112
A. Background
In Ware, members of a religious group known as the
Plymouth Brethren (the "Brethren") challenged regulations
promulgated by the Commissioner of Education (the
"Commissioner") requiring all primary and secondary school
students to receive instruction about AIDS as violative of their
First Amendment right freely to exercise their religious
beliefs. 113 The Brethren is a devoutly religious group dedicated
to strict adherence to Biblical teachings and separation from all
things they consider "evil."114  The regulations in question,
promulgated pursuant to the Commissioner's statutory authority
and with the approval of the New York State Board of
Regents, 15 required that all primary and secondary students
110 Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536, 552 (N.Y. 1987) (Alexander, J., dissenting).
111 550 N.E.2d 420 (N.Y. 1989).
112 For a critique of Ware under the First Amendment, see Donna Marie
Werner, Ware v. Valley Stream High School District: At What Expense Should
Religious Freedoms Be Preserved?, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 347 (1990).
113 The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
114 Ware, 550 N.E.2d at 422.
115 See Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 545 N.Y.S.2d 316, 318 (2d Dep't
1989).
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receive appropriate instruction concerning AIDS, including
information "concerning the nature of the disease, methods of
transmission, and methods of prevention,... stress [ing]
abstinence as the most appropriate and effective premarital
protection against AIDS."1 6 The regulations further provided
that parents could request an exemption from AIDS-prevention
lessons from any school principal upon assurance that they
would provide suitable home instruction."17
In November 1988, plaintiffs requested that the Valley
Stream High School District exempt their children from the
entire AIDS curriculum. The District denied plaintiffs' request
but did exempt Brethren children from those portions of the
curriculum dealing with "Prevention," which covered abstinence
from illegal intravenous drug use and sexual activity to prevent
transmission of HIV."18 In February 1989, plaintiffs filed suit,
alleging that the AIDS curriculum conflicted with their strict
religious belief "that followers not engage in sexual relations
outside of marriage and not be exposed to instruction concerning
sexuality or morality other than that which is imparted in the
community.""19 Plaintiffs also alleged that an exemption would
not endanger the public in light of the improbability that their
children would participate in activities that transmit HIV.120
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division,
Second Department affirmed.' 2' In a 5-2 decision, the court of
appeals modified the appellate division's decision, denying
defendants' motion for summary judgment and remanding the
case for further development of the facts.
B. The Decision
Writing for the majority, Judge Kaye noted that that both
the Commissioner and local officials "are vested with wide
discretion in the management of school affairs." 22 Judge Kaye
116 Id. at 316 (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, §§ 135.3(b)(2), (c)(2)
(1995)).
117 Ware, 550 N.E.2d at 422 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, §§
135.3(b)(2), (c)(2) (1995)).
118 Id. at 422.
119 Id. at 423.
120 Id.
121 Ware, 545 N.Y.S.2d 316, 321.
122 Ware, 550 N.E.2d at 425 (citations omitted).
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added that "[d]eference to the education decisions of State and
local officials-particularly in matters of curriculum-embodies
several important concerns," and that "the judiciary should not
lightly intrude in the resolution of school conflicts, which usually
are best left to the education authorities." 123 The regulations in
question implicated basic constitutional rights under the First
Amendment, however, warranting the Court's strict scrutiny.124
The Court proceeded to analyze plaintiffs' claim utilizing a
two-part test, under which (1) plaintiffs must show a "sincerely
held religious belief that is burdened by a State requirement,"
and (2) the State must demonstrate that the requirement
nevertheless serves a compelling governmental purpose, and
that an exemption would "substantially impede fulfillment of
that goal."125 Addressing the first part of the test, the Court
explained that "mere exposure to ideas that contradict religious
beliefs does not impermissibly burden the free exercise of
religion."126 Further, the First Amendment does not guarantee
that school curriculum will not offend any religious group, and
plaintiffs have no right to demand public school programs
tailored to their individual preferences. 127
The Court ruled, however, that plaintiffs fit within the
narrow, "mere exposure" 128 exception that the Supreme Court
recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder.129 In Yoder, a group of Amish
plaintiffs successfully asserted that a state law mandating school
attendance until the age of 16 compelled them, "under threat of
criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with
fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs,"130 thus violating
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Yoder
plaintiffs alleged, in short, that compulsory school attendance
123 Id. (citations omitted).
124 Id. at 426.
125 Id. (citation omitted).
126 Id. at 427.
127 Id.
128 See, e.g., Lisa M. Sperry, Commercialism in New York Public Schools: State
Versus Local Control, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 339, 361 (1996) ("The exception to
the general prohibition against protection from exposure to objectionable ideas is
narrow. Exposure to ideas which are not merely offensive, but are abhorrent to the
plaintiffs central and entrenched religious beliefs may be grounds for a violation of
the Free Exercise Clause."). But see Werner, supra note 112, at 355-56 (arguing
that no such exception exists).
129 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
130 Id. at 218.
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threatened the continuing existence of the Amish community.131
The Ware plaintiffs similarly alleged that the mandatory
AIDS curriculum "could alone destroy the foundations of their
faith and 'jeopardize their place in the holy fellowship of God's
Son.' "132 The Court therefore concluded that, under Yoder,
plaintiffs might be able to demonstrate that they were
impermissibly burdened by the regulations. The record was
insufficient, however, to determine whether the AIDS
curriculum was contrary to the Brethren's beliefs or potentially
destructive of the community as a whole. The Court accordingly
remanded the case for further factual development on the
questions whether "the free exercise of sincerely held religious
beliefs is burdened by compulsory AIDS education, how great
such a burden might be, and what if any further accommodation
should be made."1 33
On the issue of compelling interest, the appellate division's
ruling was clear: citing the Court's decision in Doe v. Coughlin,
the appellate division held that "the State's interest in AIDS
education on its face was so compelling that it necessarily would
override plaintiffs' free exercise rights."13 4 The appellate division
rejected plaintiffs' argument that they could properly instruct
their children at home, observing that "uncontradicted religious
indoctrination which denies the existence of undeniable health
crises does not provide a suitable alternative to education."13 5
Finally, the appellate division rejected plaintiffs' argument that
an exemption would not endanger the public health given the
unlikelihood that Brethren children would contract or pass the
virus:
Significantly, the Brethren's doctrine contemplates that some of
its adherents may stray from its rigorous precepts and provides
that "fsodomites], fornicators and adulterers [will be]
withdrawn from" and may be cast out of the community. Such
131 See id. at 212 (Plaintiffs' expert testified that compulsory high school
attendance would "ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish
church community as it exists in the United States today.").
132 Ware, 550 N.E.2d at 430.
133 Id. at 428.
134 Id. at 429; see Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 545 N.Y.S.2d 316, 317
(2d Dep't 1989) ("[W]e conclude that there are compelling and dominant State
interests underlying the limited health education curriculum to which the
appellants' children will be exposed, and, accordingly, hold in favor of the
respondents.").
135 Ware, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
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individuals, who would then be integrated into society-at-large,
ignorant of AIDS and its methods of transmission and
prevention, will surely be at risk and will, undeniably, if
infected, constitute a potentially grave risk to all with whom
they come into intimate contact. 136
The Court did not see it so clearly. Judge Kaye
acknowledged that the State had a "compelling interest in
controlling AIDS, which presents a public health concern of the
highest order."137 She also acknowledged that the State had a
compelling interest in educating its youth about AIDS, and that
"[e]ducation regarding the means by which AIDS is
communicated is a powerful weapon against the spread of the
disease and clearly an essential component of our nationwide
struggle to combat it." 138 Nonetheless, Judge Kaye cautioned
that "constitutional protections do not readily yield to blanket
assertions of exigency," and that "the threat of AIDS cannot
summarily obliterate this Nation's fundamental values."1 39
The state's compelling interest, Judge Kaye explained, "does
not, in and of itself, end all inquiry as to whether 35 Brethren
children must be denied an exemption." 140 Specifically, the
question whether the state's interest would be substantially
impeded by granting plaintiffs an exemption hinged upon two
disputed factual issues. First, defendants' allegation that some
Brethren children might go astray, leave the community, or be
cast out was, as plaintiffs insisted, "pure speculation; there is no
evidence either way as to defections among the New York State
Brethren."' 4 ' Even if these events occurred, moreover, plaintiffs
disputed that the education they provided left their children ill-
equipped to cope with the dangers of HIV. The latter point was,
in fact, what the Court identified as the second contested fact: if
plaintiffs could show that their instruction was the functional
equivalent of the AIDS curriculum, then the state "might well be
required to accommodate their beliefs." 142 The Court remanded
136 Id.
137 Ware, 550 N.E.2d at 429.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 429. Judge Kaye later reiterated this caution: "[Wihile the spread of
AIDS heightens and intensifies the public interest in education, it does not overturn
other cherished values that may not require sacrifice." Id. at 430.
140 Id. at 429.
141 Id. at 430.
142 Id.
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the case to the trial court for further factual development of
these questions. 143
Like Yoder, the Court's decision in Ware was based on
discreet and highly unusual circumstances. Indeed, in Yoder,
the Supreme Court explained that plaintiffs' demonstration of
burden was one "probably few other religious groups or sects
could make."1 44  In his dissent in Ware, Judge Bellacosa
described Yoder as "an extraordinarily exceptional dispensation
from the primacy of a universal public educational
curriculum.' '145 The majority in Ware similarly acknowledged
that "[t]he reach of Yoder is plainly limited,"146 and emphasized
that the Brethren are a longstanding, highly individual-if not
unique-religious group."1 47 Like Yoder, then, the precedential
value of Ware is questionable. 148 Yet the court's treatment of the
issue of AIDS prevention is elucidating, particularly in
comparison with Doe, decided two years earlier.
There are many parallels between Ware and Doe: both
involved regulations promulgated by a State official granted
wide discretion, in an area in which the Court was loathe to
intervene, and both involved constitutional challenges to
regulations drafted to combat the spread of HIV. The differences
143 Judge Titone questioned whether such issues could be resolved through
further factual inquiry. See id. at 433 (Titone, J., dissenting) ("[A] serious question
would exist as to what kind of further proof defendants could conceivably muster.").
144 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972).
145 Ware, 550 N.E.2d at 436.
146 Id. at 427. The Ware Court acknowledged, "Commentators have speculated
that '[flew future free exercise claimants are likely to match the testimony of
extreme injury relied upon by the Supreme Court in Yoder.' " Id. (quoting Stephen
Pepper, Reynolds, Yoder, and Beyond: Alternatives for the Free Exercise Clause,
1981 UTAH L. REV. 309, 338 (1981)) (other citations omitted).
147 Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
148 See Jay S. Bybee, Substantive Due Process and Free Exercise of Religion:
Meyer, Pierce and the Origins of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 887, 931
(1996) ("In the end analysis, Yoder yields little law."); Stephen L. Carter, Does the
First Amendment Protect More Than Free Speech?, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 871, 882
(1992) ("No group other than the Amish has been given so broad an exemption from
generally applicable laws, and were the Yoder case to arise today, it is not at all
clear that the outcome would be the same."); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 99, 130
("Yoder, although an interesting case, is not thought to be doctrinally
significant .. "); Karl J. Sanders, Kids and Condoms: Constitutional Challenges to
the Distribution of Condoms in Public Schools, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1479, 1486 (1993)
("ITihe precedential weight of Ware is arguably minimal, limited to the minority of
plaintiffs who can classify themselves as a truly unique religious group.").
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in the Court's reasoning, however, are apparent-differences
that the Court could not fairly justify. In Ware, the Court was
cautious not to abrogate the constitutional rights of a minority in
the name of controlling the spread of HIV. Applying strict
scrutiny, the Court refused to accept defendant's sweeping
assertions that the regulations were necessary to prevent the
spread of HIV. Instead, the Court remanded the case for further
proceedings to determine, inter alia, whether the state's goal
could be achieved through less burdensome means.
In Doe, although the majority of justices urged the Court to
apply a stricter scrutiny than mere rational basis to protect
fundamental constitutional rights, the Court failed to do so. The
Court upheld Respondents' decision without a searching
inquiry-let alone a remand, as in Ware-to determine whether
Respondents' decision was necessary, or whether less
burdensome alternatives existed through which to achieve the
same goals. The Doe Court blindly accepted the highly
speculative argument that the Does might somehow spread the
virus to the community; the Ware Court refused to accept
defendant's "pure speculation"149 that some Brethren children
might leave the community and remanded for further discovery
on this issue.150
The Ware Court strongly warned against trampling
constitutional protections in the face of "blanket assertions of
exigency." 151  Yet, in Doe, the Court did precisely that,
unjustifiably-and appallingly-denying a prisoner the right to
visit with family members merely because he was living with
149 Ware, 550 N.E.2d at 430.
160 Ironically, had the Court desired simply to uphold the regulation, Yoder
would have provided ample authority. In Yoder, the Supreme Court expressly noted
that no "harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety...
had been demonstrated or may be properly inferred." 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972). The
State's interest was thus less than compelling. In Ware, by contrast, the State was
acting to prevent harm to both the child and the public, both compelling interests
under Yoder. No amount of evidence on remand could prove that the threat of such
harm did not exist.
151 Ware, 505 N.E.2d at 429. In summarily rejecting the Does' claims, Judge
Lawrence E. Kahn of the New York Supreme Court expressly recognized the fear
and anxiety over the spread of HIV and AIDS. In light of the public hysteria over
AIDS, Judge Kahn observed that "it is incumbent upon the courts to render
determinations on the basis of sound legal principles with guidance from the latest
medical and scientific research available." Doe v. Coughlin, 505 N.Y.S.2d 534, 536
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1986). Unfortunately, however, neither Judge Kahn nor
the majority of appellate judges followed this advice.
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HIV.152 One year after Ware, moreover, the Court would again
credit blanket assertions of exigency, effectively denying persons
living with HIV access to private medical insurance.
III. HEALTH INSURANCE ASS'N. OFAMERICA v.
CORCORAN (1990)
A. Background
In Health Insurance Ass'n of America v. Corcoran,153 various
insurance companies and associations ("Petitioners") challenged
a 1987 regulation promulgated by the State Superintendent of
Insurance (the "Superintendent") regarding the use of HIV tests
in insurance.1 54 The regulation ("Regulation"), which applied
only to individual and small group health insurance policies, 55
banned such insurers from: (1) considering HIV test results in
determining an applicant's insurability; (2) requesting an
applicant to submit to an HIV test; and (3) inquiring whether an
applicant had previously taken an HIV test, or inquiring as to
the results of any such test.156 The Regulation was issued
following notice and an opportunity for public comment at an
"extensive hearing,"157 and after the Commissioner of Health had
certified that the prohibited practices were "contrary to the
health care needs of the public."158
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the Superintendent
exceeded his delegated statutory authority in promulgating the
Regulation, and that the Regulation violated provisions of the
152 When asked about the Doe decision some years later, Judge Alexander
replied:
I think the driving force was a consideration of the larger community. Of
course, my view was there was no demonstrated danger to the large
community and it was a presumption to think that the wife would contract
AIDS and then go out and violate her marriage vows. I thought we should
have focused on the rights of the prisoners.
Catherine M. Feehan & Elisa Karnis, Is There a High Ground in the Middle of the
Road? A Review and Analysis of the Jurisprudence of the Honorable Fritz W.
Alexander 11, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL. COMMENT. 531, 558 (1993).
153 551 N.Y.S.2d 615 (3d Dep't 1990), affd, 565 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1990).
154 The regulation was promulgated as N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, §
52.27 (1999).
155 Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 616. These constituted 10 to 15% of all health
insurance policies issued in the State of New York. See id.
156 Id. at 616.
157 Id.
158 Id. (quoting N.Y. INS. LAW § 3217(b)(4) (McKinney 1985)).
20021
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
New York State Insurance Law which permitted insurers to
solicit relevant information from an applicant to determine the
actuarial .risks of insuring the applicant and to disclaim coverage
for preexisting conditions: 159 Affirming the lower court, the
Appellate Division, Third Department agreed with Petitioners,
unanimously declaring the regulation invalid. In a unanimous
decision, the court of appeals affirmed, adopting the Third
Department's decision rather than issuing its own decision. 160
We must therefore analyze the Third Department's decision.
B. The Decision
The Superintendent based his authority to issue the
Regulation on three specific statutory provisions empowering
him to supervise the insurance industry and to issue regulations.
These included the authority to disapprove insurance policy
forms; 161 a provision prohibiting an insurer from discriminating
"between individuals of the same class ... in any of the terms or
conditions [of any health insurance policy] or in any other
manner whatsoever";162 and the authority to issue regulations to
establish minimum standards for the form, content, and sale of
health insurance policies.163 Of these, the Superintendent relied
most heavily upon the third provision, which, as we shall see,
expressly authorized the Superintendent to consider "the health
care needs of the public." 64
1. Fairness, Equity, and Nondiscrimination
Addressing the first two of these provisions, the Third
Department explained that the Superintendent's power to
disapprove policy forms "is appropriate for provisions 'likely to
mislead the public * * * [or be] prejudicial to the interests of the
policyholders.' "165 The use of an HIV test, the court ruled, was
neither misleading nor prejudicial. Instead, it was a valid
underwriting tool, a "means of identifying a class substantially
159 See N.Y. INS. LAW § 3105 (McKinney 2000).
160 Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. v. Corcoran, 565 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1990).
161 See N.Y. INS. LAW § 3201 (McKinney 2000).
162 Id. § 4224(b)(1).
163 See id. § 3217.
164 See infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
165 Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. v. Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d 615, 618 (3d Dep't 1990),
affd, 565 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1990) (quoting Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Thacher, 222 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1st Dep't 1961), affd, 83 N.E.2d 79 (N.Y. 1962)).
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more prone to AIDS than the general population."1 66  Such
underwriting practices, the court observed, promote fairness to
policyholders by not requiring them to bear in premiums the
costs of insuring other individuals in higher risk categories. 167
The court similarly dismissed the Insurance Law's
antidiscrimination provision as a basis for promulgating the
Regulation. The court explained that the prohibition against
discrimination "ha[s] been authoritatively construed not to apply
when differential treatment has a proper underwriting basis."168
Hence, sections 3201 and 4224 of the Insurance Law did not
authorize the Superintendent to promulgate the Regulation
because "HIV testing, as a sound underwriting practice, is not
unfair, inequitable, discriminatory or deceptive."169
In finding the use of HIV tests neither unfair, inequitable,
nor discriminatory, the court relied heavily upon what it
perceived as the catastrophic costs that the AIDS epidemic
threatened to impose upon the industry, implicating the very
"solvency of the insurer [s]. ''170 Indeed, the court virtually took
judicial notice of this proposition, announcing that "[ilt can
hardly be denied" that AIDS "represents a formidable financial
threat of disastrous proportions to health insurers."1 71
But was this true? The court noted that nothing in the
record cast doubt upon "this fact";72 at the same time, however,
the court failed to cite a single authority for this finding. In
truth, AIDS did not pose an unprecedented or disastrous threat
to the insurance industry, and the singling out of HIV and AIDS
for exclusion from coverage supported a finding of unfairness,
inequity, and/or discrimination.
Although the Superintendent may not have emphasized this
issue, one of the commentators whom the court expressly cited
and discussed made this very argument three years before
Corcoran was decided:
[Iindustry claims that HIV antibody testing is compelled by
economic necessity do not withstand scrutiny. In the first
place, insurers have greatly exaggerated the cost of AIDS. A
166 Id. at 620.
167 Id. at 618-19.
168 Id. at 619.
169 Id. at 620.
170 Id. at 619.
171 Id. (emphasis added).
172 Id. (emphasis added).
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study commissioned by the CDC estimates the cost of treating
people with AIDS to be only 0.2% of the nation's total personal
health care expenditures in 1985, with a projected rise to 1.4%
by 1991. The same authors estimate the average cost of
treating people with AIDS in 1986 to be $60,000 to 75,000 per
person, far less than many other illnesses.17 3
The author, Benjamin Schatz, was not alone. The following
year, another author explained that "[i]n comparison with other
health care costs, the cost of AIDS represents a relatively small,
but growing portion of total personal health care
expenditures .... -"174 In a more comprehensive article, a
commentator writing in 1989 explained, after careful analysis:
AIDS is not an unusually important cause of death, nor is its
exclusion necessary to prevent the destruction of the insurance
market. It is, therefore, inappropriate to exclude coverage for
costs attributable to AIDS from either group or individual
health or life insurance policies unless all of the higher risk
losses are also excluded. In addition, it would be inappropriate
to exclude all HIV positive individuals from coverage. While
HIV seropositivity does correlate with the occurrence of AIDS,
there are equivalent factors which correlate with the more
frequent causes of premature death. 175
Yet another article that year noted that "losses from AIDS
are not significantly different than those from other catastrophic
illnesses and may, in fact, be lower.' 76  Furthermore, in
February of 1989, in a front-page article, the New York Times
explained that "[e]arlier forecasts that AIDS would bankrupt
insurance companies, hospitals and governments have not
materialized.1 77
Thus, evidence directly contradicting the court's
pronouncement of AIDS as a financial disaster for the insurance
173 Benjamin Schatz, The AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwriting or
Overreaching?, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1782, 1794-95 (1987); see also Corcoran, 551
N.Y.S.2d at 622 (citing and discussing this article).
174 Nancy Perkins, Prohibiting the Use of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Antibody Test by Employers and Insurers, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 275, 278-79
(1988).
175 Kenneth Vogel, Discrimination on the Basis of HIV Infection: An Economic
Analysis, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 965, 991 (1989).
176 Judith A. Berman, Note, AIDS Antibody Testing and Health Insurance
Underwriting: A Paradigmatic Inquiry, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059, 1072 (1989).
177 Bruce Lambert, Flaws in Health Care System Emerge as Epidemic Rages,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1989, at Al.
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industry was available to the court; indeed it was conspicuously
discussed in the Schatz article, which the court quoted.178 The
court persisted, however, in advancing its outdated, 179
unfounded, and dispositive prediction of potential insolvency for
the industry. As one author explained:
In the early 1980s ... some insurance companies. and hospitals,
facing an increasing number of HIV patients with long hospital
stays and potential labor-intensive care, claimed that the
enormous costs of AIDS threatened to drive them into
insolvency. The earliest studies on the potential cost of the
epidemic indicated that the health care industry's costs would
be extraordinary and in a different class than that of other
serious illnesses. However, in 1986 and 1987, the studies of
other respected institutions tempered some of the high
numbers that were initially reported and estimated costs from
diagnosis to death that were well below previous figures.'80
These figures, the author explained, demonstrated that the
costs of treating HIV and AIDS were "no more disastrous than
178 In addition to the passage quoted above, the author added: "The fact that
the HIV antibody test is not crucial to insurance company survival has been borne
out by industry spokespersons, who have conceded that insurers have been able to
operate without disruption in states that ban use of the test." Schatz, supra note
173, at 1795.
179 See Daniel M. Fox and Emily H. Thomas, The Cost of AIDS: Exaggeration,
Entitlement, and Economics, in AIDS AND THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 197, 205
(Lawrence 0. Gostin, ed., 1990) ("By the summer of 1986, then, the general
consensus among experts on health care costs was that AIDS was expensive to
treat, but not as costly as had earlier been feared.").
180 William A. Bradford, Jr. et al., The AIDS Epidemic and Health Care Reform,
27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 279, 299 (1994). Writing in 1990, the year Corcoran was
decided, two other commentators similarly explained:
Between 1983 and 1985, executives of hospitals and health insurance firms
attracted the most attention by claiming that the costs were enormous and
unprecedented and posed a threat to the solvency of their organizations.
The earliest published data seemed to confirm this foreboding. Systematic
studies begun in 1985 and completed over the next two years challenged
this view, however. They presented AIDS as being about as expensive as
other fatal illnesses, but with a dramatically increasing incidence,
particularly among the poor.
Fox and Thomas, supra note 179, at 198; accord MICHAEL T. ISBELL, HEALTH CARE
REFORM: LESSONS FROM THE HIV EPIDEMIC 1, 69 (1993) ("ITlhe commercial
insurance industry embarked in the 1980s on a barely disguised campaign to avoid
paying its fair share of HIV-related medical costs."); Daniel M. Fox, AIDS and the
American Health Polity: The History and Prospects of a Crisis Authority, in AIDS:
THE BURDENS OF HISTORY at 316, 331 (Elizabeth Fee & Daniel M. Fox eds., 1988)
("Many insurance executives embraced the highest estimates, perhaps because they
wanted the states or the federal government to assume the burden of payment.").
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for other serious illnesses.''1s8 Nonetheless, the early, doomsday
estimates "created the perception that AIDS-related illnesses are
uniquely costly to the health care and insurance industries."18 2
Commentators throughout the 1990s have confirmed that
AIDS did not, and does not, represent a threat of disastrous
proportions to the insurance industry.8 3  Perhaps more
importantly, numerous commentators have demonstrated that
the cost of treating HIV and AIDS is not significantly greater,
and is often considerably less, than that of treating other
illnesses that insurers continue to cover18 4 Schatz made this
181 Bradford, supra note 180, at 299.
182 Id. at 300; accord Michael T. Isbell, AIDS and Access to Care: Lessons for
Health Care Reformers, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 7, 14 n.48 (1993) ("[Tjhe
commercial insurance industry's own financial data demonstrate the absurdity of
claims that HIV threatened the viability of private insurers."); Robert A. Padgug et
al., AIDS and Private Health Insurance: A Crisis of Risk Sharing, 3 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 55, 56 (1993) ("Commercial insurers, as well as the public, were
persuaded by early cost estimates which inaccurately calculated the costs of
treating AIDS and firmly established AIDS as a disease with unacceptably high
costs.").
183 See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 180, at 300 ("Spending for AIDS is less than
one percent of the total amount of medical spending in the United States, and the
National Commission on AIDS has predicted that it is likely that this amount will
never rise above two percent."); James R. Bruner, AIDS and ERISA Preemption:
The Double Threat, 41 DUKE. L.J. 1115, 1125 (1992) ("The financial predictions
standing alone fail to provide persuasive justification for employers' and the
insurance industry's efforts to exclude AIDS patients."); Isbell, supra note 182, at 13
("During the early years of the AIDS epidemic, commentators feared that AIDS
would bankrupt the health care system. Experience, however, has revealed such
fears to be baseless. Medical spending on pjeople with HIV currently accounts for
roughly 1 percent of health care spending in the United States."); Li, supra note 10,
at 483 ("Results of the [1996 survey by the Health Insurance Association of America
and the American Council of Life Insurance] provide evidence that AIDS-related
claims do not pose a justifiable threat to the financial well-being of commercial
insurance companies. Therefore, the private insurance industry does not have any
foundation for the fear that the AIDS epidemic would financially destroy the
business."); Samuel A. Marcosson, Who Is "Us" and Who Is "Them"--Common
Threads and the Discriminatory Cut-Off of Health Care Benefits for AIDS Under
ERISA and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 361 (1994)
(extensively discussing this topic); Padgug, supra note 182, at 59 ("[Tlhe reports of
the health insurance industry's impending death were greatly exaggerated.").
184 See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg, AIDS and Insurance: How Private Health
Coverage Relates to HIV/AIDS Infection and to Public Programs, 77 IOWA L. REV.
1561, 1574 (1992) ("AIDS spending looks less extreme relative to other expensive
areas, a number of which cost more per case or in overall spending."); Bradford,
supra note 180, at 299 ("While the costs of HIV and AIDS medical care are great,
they are not vastly different than for other serious medical conditions."); Bruner,
supra note 183, at 1125 n.48 ("AIDS is no more costly to treat than many other life-
threatening illnesses."); Marcosson, supra note 183, at 391 ("AIDS treatment does
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very point in his 1987 article,185 as did other contemporaneous
commentators. 186 One commentator noted, for example,. that
"AIDS is comparable to cancer as a cause of premature death in
this age and sex group [of men aged 25 to 44]: there are 39,500
years of potential life lost to cancer and only 32,300 to AIDS."18 7
To take but a' few examples, the "[11]ifetime medical costs for
a person with AIDS range between $75,000 and $85,000, as
compared with liver transplants at about $235,000, heart
transplants at $148,000, end-stage renal disease at $158,000 and
cancer at $29,000 for only the last six months of life."8 8 Heart
disease treatment, moreover, cost $101.3 billion in health care
expenditures in 1990 (the year in which the court of appeals
decided Corcoran), which was 20 times the amount required for
AIDS-related care in 1991.189 And the annual cost of medical
care for AIDS was actually less than the cost of a year's supply of
clotting factor for a hemophiliac. 90 In the year before Corcoran
was decided, finally, reported deaths attributed to HIV illness
accounted for only 1% of all deaths in the United States, whereas
the proportion of deaths due to cancer rose to 23%.191
not cost more than many other serious or fatal illnesses."); Pagdug, supra note 182,
at 62 ("While the data clearly demonstrates that lifetime treatment costs of persons
with AIDS are substantial, they are not unlike treatment costs incurred by persons
with other serious diseases typically covered by health insurance policies."); Robert
E. Stein, The Rights of Employees with AIDS: The Conflict Between the Need for
Adequate Insurance Coverage and Individual Privacy in the Workplace, 10 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 557 (1995) ("Contrary to the belief of some, HIV is not
that expensive a disease on a per capita basis compared to many other diseases. The
estimated cost per person for lifetime treatment of HIV and Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") is about $119,000."); see also Alan I. Widiss, HIV
Infection Among Women of Reproductive Age, Children, and Adolescents: To Insure
or Not to Insure Persons Infected with the Virus that Causes AIDS, 77 IOWA L. REV.
1617, 1639 (1992) ("[W]hen AIDS is analyzed as a disease in terms of its cause (that
is, etiology), diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis, there is virtually no reason to view
it as a medical problem whose uniqueness warrants treating it differently when
there are questions about insuring persons who may be infected.").
185 Schatz, supra note 173, at 1794-95.
186 See Berman, supra note 176, at 1070; Perkins, supra note 174, at 278; Vogel,
supra note 175, at 991.
187 Vogel, supra note 175, at 991. Years of potential life lost constitutes the
number of years below 65 that a person dies. Id. at 991 n.125.
188 Diana Slivinska, Note, Health Care Cost-Containment and Small
Businesses: The Self-Insurance Option, 12 J.L. & COM. 333, 342-43 (1993).
189 See Bradford, supra note 180, at 300 n.158.
190 See ISBELL, supra note 180, at 68.
191 See Widiss, supra note 184, at 1639 n.92.
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While the costs to the insurance company would not be
catastrophic, the costs to persons living with HIV were. Owing
to the tremendous gaps and inadequacies in the U.S. health care
system, persons living with HIV were forced to become fully
destitute before they could qualify for medical assistance
through Medicaid, 192  as the Commissioner noted in his
certification to the Superintendent. 193 Additionally, among other
things, Medicaid covered only persons diagnosed with AIDS, not
merely HIV.194 As a consequence, uninsured persons living with
HIV were unable to obtain crucial, early medical assistance until
diagnosed with full-blown AIDS. 195 Without private medical
insurance, then, many individuals living with HIV were left with
no coverage of any kind.196 As one commentator observed:
192 See Bovbjerg, supra note 184, at 1603 ("Ordinarily, people must lose their
jobs, their private health insurance, and most of their income and assets to qualify
for Medicaid."); Isbell, supra note 182, at 15 ("Upon loss of coverage, persons with
HIV move to 'self-pay,' depleting personal resources in order to finance medical care.
After becoming sufficiently pauperized and/or ill to qualify for public assistance,
patients generally look to Medicaid for health coverage."). For an excellent
discussion of this issue see Bradford, supra note 180.
193 See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
194 See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 180, at 310 ("A person with full-blown AIDS is
considered 'disabled' under the guidelines, but seropositive people with mild
symptoms or those who are being treated only prophylactically (e.g., AZT
maintenance) may have trouble gaining eligibility to the program."); Linda C.
Fentinan, Symposium: What Lessons Have We Learned from the AIDS Pandemic?:
AIDS as a Chronic Illness: A Cautionary Tale for the End of the Twentieth Century,
61 ALB. L. REV. 989, 1005 (1998) (noting that Medicaid and drug reimbursement
programs "cover only persons who have been diagnosed with AIDS, rather than the
larger group of those who have tested HIV positive."); Isbell, supra note 182, at 32-
33 ("Medicaid eligibility is thus normally impossible until a person with HIV
exhibits an official AIDS indicator disease."). As one commentator noted, "As a
result of these rules, poor people with HIV infection experience needless illness,
have a poorer quality of life, and die sooner than more affluent HIV-positive
patients." ISBELL, supra note 180, at 104.
195 See Bradford, supra note 180, at 284 ("Their limited economic means
prevent them from developing an ongoing relationship with a physician; many
receive little, if any, preventive care. Often, their only encounter with a medical
provider is in the emergency room of a public hospital."); Isbell, supra note 182, at
33 ("The restrictive requirements for Medicaid eligibility harm persons with HIV by
eliminating their ability to receive early care."); Lambert, supra note 177 ("Many
typically show up in emergency rooms with little time left to live.").
196 "AIDS has shown that Medicaid is shallow and inadequate," Congressman
Henry Waxman announced in 1989. "Many middle-class Americans are learning the
hard way that, in most states, you can qualify only if you are totally disabled and
have less than $1,500 to your name." Henry A. Waxman, Symposium: Current
Legal Issues in AIDS: Introduction to Symposium on AIDS, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 877,
878 (1989); see also ISBELL, supra note 180, at ii ("One quarter of all people with
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"While AIDS represents only a minor threat to insurance, the
insurance system represents a mortal threat to persons with
AIDS., 197
If HIV and AIDS did not threaten disaster for the insurance
industry, and if the costs of treating HIV and AIDS were no
greater than, and in some cases less than, other covered
illnesses, then the conclusion is inevitable that individuals living
with HIV and AIDS were being singled out for unfair,
inequitable, and discriminatory treatment. As one commentator
has explained:
The unfairness stems from the lack of monetary justification for
treating the HIV disease differently from other conditions. HIV
disease costs far less to treat than most individuals, employers
and insurance companies often assume, and comparatively less
than the treatment of other conditions. Thus, the question is
not whether it would save an insurance plan money not to treat
AIDS, because of course it would, but whether the analysis is
done fairly in comparison to the treatment of other conditions.
If treating AIDS does not cost more than other conditions, then
the surprise of a new AIDS-only coverage limitation is an
unfair one and therefore unconscionable. 198
Many commentators have posited that HIV and AIDS were
AIDS, and an even larger percentage of the HIV-infected, lack any form of health
coverage."); Widiss, supra note 184, at 1734 ("The absence of insurance or other
health care plans for thousands of individuals who are afflicted with AIDS has
again made the gaps in the nation's health care system all too conspicuous.").
197 Pagdug, supra note 182, at 60; see also ISBELL, supra note 180, at 103
("Untold thousands of working Americans have fallen into poverty as a direct result
of their HIV infection. Dependant on Medicaid, public hospitals and community
clinics for their medical care, the individuals have experienced first-hand the
nation's neglect of the health care needs of the indigent.").
198 Marc E. Elovitz, Combating AIDS Discrimination in Health Insurance, 10
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 537, 539 (1995). Several commentators, in fact,
have observed that persons living with AIDS have been singled out for unfair
treatment by insurers. "Providing adequate AIDS coverage presents fundamentally
the same dilemma as with all other costly medical conditions: high health care costs
and insufficient dollars to meet them. AIDS is singled out, however, for cuts in
benefits not made for other diseases." Marcosson, supra note 183, at 392 n.154;
accord Li, supra note 10, at 495-96 ("Although other serious diseases lead to higher
medical care expenses and related costs than AIDS, the insurance industry has not
taken an active role in screening out people suspected of having an increased chance
of contracting or developing such diseases."); Slivinska, supra note 188, at 342 ("The
only real differences between AIDS and diabetes or MD lie in the mode of
transmission and people affected. People with AIDS have been stigmatized largely
because the disease is usually transmitted through sexual contact. Not suprisingly,
the people affected are often perceived as being at fault or somehow 'deserving it.").
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targeted for discriminatory treatment because of prejudice
against gay men. 199 The fact that HIV/AIDS was considered a
gay male disease not only engendered antipathy, but it also
fostered apathy in the general public as well, since the majority
of the population considered themselves somehow immune from
the disease.200 This apathy or indifference, perhaps more than
outright hostility and phobia, may explain the public tolerance
for the insurance industry's use of HIV testing to exclude people
with aids (PWA) from coverage. As one author, writing in the
early 1990s, explained:
Cancer cannot be excluded, because so many people believe
themselves at risk that the policy would be unattractive, even
at a lower cost, if those benefits were unavailable. But AIDS is
different: the so called "good risks" may drop out rather than
pay the higher cost of a policy with full AIDS coverage. In
addition, the public tolerance of depriving people with cancer of
medical insurance is quite different from the attitude towards
leaving PWAs with little or no coverage. That is, because it is
acceptable to treat PWAs as "them," insurers can do so with
little cost in adverse publicity or public outrage.20'
199 "It is likely that the exclusion of coverage for PWAs by employers and
insurance companies is motivated by prejudice against gay men." Bruner, supra
note 183, at 1125; accord Isbell, supra note 182, at 16 ("[Tlhe private health
insurance industry has singled out HIV disease for discriminatory treatment and
has 'attempt[ed] to impose a kind of moral judgment in the determination of
coverage and payment of benefits for HIV related charges.' " (quoting REPORT TO
THE COMMISSION FROM THE TASK FORCE ON HIV/AIDS INSURANCE ISSUES 4 (1992));
Marcosson, supra note 183, at 368 n.38 ("Because the public still perceives AIDS as
a 'gay' disease, decisions to treat PWAs differently from people suffering from cancer
or heart disease may reflect anti-gay animus."); Eric C. Sohlgren, Group Health
Benefits Discrimination Against AIDS Victims: Falling Through the Gaps of Federal
Law-ERISA, the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 24
LOY. L. REV. 1247, 1259 (1991) (positing a "strong implication that the AIDS
coverage limitation has been motivated by reasons other than reducing expenses").
200 Writing in the [early] 1990s, one author explained: "Many heterosexual
Americans think they are at no significant risk of contracting AIDS. They see AIDS
as a self-inflicted condition and attribute the blame to the PWA. Viewing it as
'somebody else's problem,' they oppose spreading the cost for AIDS as is done for
medical care generally." Bruner, supra note 183, at 1126-27; accord ISBELL, supra
note 180, at 2 ("Americans often viewed AIDS as an unfortunate, albeit intractable,
problem which had little relevance to their own lives.").
201 Marcosson, supra note 183, at 430; see also Michele Zavos, AIDS and
Insurance: No Guarantees, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 18, 19 (1993) ("People with AIDS and
HIV have been singled out for adverse action because their illness is socially
unacceptable, and employers have counted on the fact that other employees would
not object to the reduction of benefits for someone with AIDS.").
[Vol.76:115
20021 HIVIAIDS IN THE NEW YORK COURTS
Regardless of the underlying reasons and motivations, the
court in Corcoran had ample grounds to determine that the use
of HIV tests to exclude coverage was unfair, inequitable, and/or
discriminatory,202 and thus to uphold the Regulation under
sections 3201 and 4224(b)(1) of the Insurance Law. Instead,
based on the court's own unsubstantiated predictions of
impending financial doom, the court found insurers
"unquestionably justified" in attempting to screen for individuals
living with HIV.203
2. The Health Care Needs of the Public
Section 3217 of the Insurance Law empowers the
Superintendent to issue regulations establishing "minimum
standards, including standards of full and fair disclosure, for the
form, content and sale of accident and health insurance
policies." 20 4  Section 3217(b) establishes five "purposes of such
minimum standards."20 5 Four of the five purposes, the court
202 See Berman, supra note 176, at 1065 ("Denying the large group of
seropositive individuals access to health insurance on the basis that a small number
of those individuals may suffer from AIDS or ARC is inequitable."); Elovitz, supra
note 198, at 542 ("[Oiffering plans with AIDS-only limitations has no actuarial basis
and therefore contravenes any notion of fairness."); see also Slivinska, supra note
188, at 342 ("Then limitation of benefits for AIDS-related claims is nothing more
than a hysterical reaction to a largely unjustified fear.").
203 Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. v. Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d 615, 619 (3d Dep't 1990),
affd, 565 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1990). The court observed that neither the
Superintendent nor the Commissioner had "any special technical expertise in
deciding the fundamental question of how the potentially enormous financial and
human costs of the AIDS crisis should be borne within society." Id. at 622 (citation
omitted). The decision to promulgate the Regulation, the court explained,
"[niecessarily involved" weighing "the substantial increase in health care costs to
insurers and.., health insurance costs to non-HIV-infected insureds... as against
the serious financial and human costs to seropositive persons and the financial costs
to the State if testing is permitted." Id. at 621-22. It was clearly foreseeable,
however, that a weighing of competing interests and costs would be involved any
time the Superintendent eliminated, in the interest of public health, a measure
adopted by the insurance industry. Yet nowhere in the statute is such a weighing of
costs mentioned, let alone mandated. Similarly, the legislature provided no
exception for those cases in which the Superintendent's decision would result in an
increase in costs to the insurance industry, or to insureds. Instead, the statute
empowers the Superintendent to eliminate measures that are contrary to the health
care needs of the public, without regard to cost, when the Commissioner of Health
so certifies. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 3217(b)(4) (McKinney 1985).
204 N.Y. INS. LAW § 3217(a) (McKinney 1985).
205 Id. § 3217(b) (McKinney 1985).
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observed, "can be fairly characterized as consumer protective in
orientation."2 6 As the court acknowledged, however, section
3217(b)(4) "is couched in broader terms,"207 establishing as one
purpose the "elimination of provisions which may be contrary to
the health care needs of the public, as certified to the
superintendent by the commissioner of health."208 Nothing in
the language of this provision, or its legislative history, limits
the Superintendent's power merely to matters involving
consumer protection. 209
Prior to the Superintendent's promulgation of the
Regulation in 1987, the Commissioner of Health (the
"Commissioner") duly certified to the Superintendent that the
use of HIV tests in screening applicants for insurance coverage
was contrary to the health care needs of the public. The
Commissioner of Health cited five independent reasons for this
conclusion: (1) HIV tests only identify individuals as
seropositive, and it was not definitively known at the time how
many of those individuals would ultimately progress to AIDS;210
thus, "[t]he tests are, at best, limited predictors of morbidity and
mortality"; (2) "there are serious social and psychological impacts
upon those denied insurance for testing HTV positive, who may
never contract AIDS or ARC, discouraging them from seeking
treatment for regular medical care and forcing them to become
impoverished so as to become eligible for Medicaid payment of
their costs of health care"; (3) the threat of insurance
disqualification would deter voluntary testing and submission to
counseling, "the only currently effective means of AIDS control";
(4) increased HIV testing by insurers would endanger
confidentiality, producing emotional and economic hardships for
seropositive persons whose status is disclosed; and (5) there were
accurate tests for diagnosing applicants living with AIDS,
making testing for HIV seropositivity unnecessary. 211
Despite the fact that the Superintendent was acting
pursuant to explicit statutory authority in promulgating the
206 Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
207 Id.
208 N.Y. INS. LAW § 3217(b)(4) (McKinney 1985).
209 See Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 621 ("Nowhere in the legislative history is
this provision specifically explained.").
210 The reliability of the HIV tests for purposes of diagnosis improved vastly in
the years after Corcoran was decided. See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 184, at 1731.
211 Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
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Regulation, and although the Commissioner duly certified that
the use of HIV tests was contrary to the health care needs of the
public on five different grounds, the court declared the
Regulation invalid. To uphold the Regulation, the court
explained, would be to give the Superintendent and the
Commissioner "carte blanche to drastically disturb longstanding
principles of accepted insurer underwriting practices in order to
further the Commissioner of Health's own objectives in public
health."212  This characterization of the Commissioner's
certification as merely reflecting his "own objectives" was
manifestly unfair, and unfounded. There was no indication that
the Commissioner was acting other than in his official capacity
as the State's top health expert and official in submitting the
certification. He advanced no fewer than five independent
justifications for declaring the policy of HIV testing by insurers
contrary to the health care fteeds of the public. The court
articulated no principled basis, moreover, upon which to
distinguish this particular certification as reflecting the
Commissioner's own objectives, rather than the valid objectives
of New York State as determined by its top health official-
objectives that the Court would unanimously uphold one year
later in Axelrod.213 Under the court's reasoning, then, any
certification with which the court disagrees could be deemed
invalid upon this basis.
The court simply abrogated, through judicial fiat, an
unambiguous provision of the law that, according to the court,
granted these officials too much power. As Judge Bellacosa
observed three years earlier, under similar circumstances:
While the court admits the difficulty under the high separation
of powers standard of articulating the basis for drawing, and
even finding, some line limiting [respondent's] conceded
exercise of authority, it nevertheless goes ahead and does so.
Its line is no line, but rather an arbitrary judgment call of its
own. It is this judicial branch intrusion which constitutes the
truly egregious separation of powers breach into the exercise of
prerogative of the Legislature and of the executive.214
To make matters worse, the court later contradicted itself,
characterizing the Regulation as reflecting the Superintendent's
212 Id. at 621 (emphasis added).
213 See infra notes 227-70 and accompanying text.
214 Boreali v. Axelrod, 517 N.E.2d 1350, 1359 (N.Y. 1987).
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personal objectives, rather than the Health Commissioner's:
"[Riespondent exceeds his authority when, by regulation, he
'effect[s] [his own] vision of societal policy choices .... " ,,215 The
Superintendent unequivocally did not effect "his own vision" of
policy choices; instead, he relied upon the state's top health
official to guide his decision, as the statute expressly empowered
him to do.216
The contrasts between Corcoran and the Court's decision in
Doe are apparent and striking. The court in Corcoran
acknowledged that, like Respondents in Doe, the Superintendent
"has wide authority to prescribe regulations and in doing so may
exercise broad power to interpret and implement legislative
policy."217  In addition, the Superintendent was explicitly
empowered to protect "the health care needs of the public," 218
rather than merely to consider the "safety" of the
"community."219 Unlike Respondents in Doe, moreover, the
Superintendent received explicit guidance from the New York
State Commissioner of Health in formulating his policy with
respect to HIV. His policy was therefore in keeping with, rather
than contrary to, sound public health policy. Hence, while the
issue at bar in Corcoran was similar to that in Doe, the
Superintendent's Regulation was supported by clear statutory
authority and the state's highest authority on public health.
Under Doe, then, one would have expected the court of appeals
(and the Third Department) to uphold the Superintendent's
Regulation; however, they did not, neither by distinguishing nor
215 Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
216 For this reason, Corcoran can be distinguished from Life Insurance Ass'n of
Massachusetts v. Commissioner of Insurance, in which the Massachusetts Supreme
Court invalidated similar regulations promulgated by the Massachusetts
commissioner of insurance. See 530 N.E.2d 168 (Mass. 1988). In that case, the court
found that the commissioner "had no authority, express or implied, to adopt the
regulations in question." Id. at 170. The Massachusetts commissioner was not
statutorily empowered to protect the health care needs of the public, and there was
no indication that the commissioner relied upon the express findings of state health
officials in promulgating his regulations. Not surprisingly, then, the court in
Corcoran did not even cite Life Insurance Ass'n in support of its decision.
217 Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 617 (citing Ostrer v. Schenck, 364 N.E.2d 1107,
1108 (N.Y. 1977)).
218 N.Y. INS. LAw § 3217(b)(4) (McKinney 1985) (emphasis added).
219 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 70(2) (a)(McKinney 1987); see also Doe v. Coughlin,
518 N.E.2d 536, 553 (N.Y. 1987) (Alexander, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Legislature has
not delegated to the Department of Correctional Services the authority to regulate
in matters relating to public health.").
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by even mentioning Doe in their opinion.
The Court ruled, finally, that the Regulation "drastically
disturb[s] longstanding principles of accepted insurer
underwriting practices," 220 practices which were "previously
sanctioned and encouraged under basic principles of insurance
law and regulation."221 This was simply untrue. The assessment
of actuarial risk is, generally, an accepted underwriting
practice.222 The specific practice of screening applicants through
the use of an HIV test, however, was certainly not "sanctioned
and encouraged" in the law. Indeed, as the court acknowledged,
the Legislature displayed "indecisiveness on the policy issue."223
The fact that assessment of actuarial risk is generally
accepted, moreover, does not insulate the practice when applied
in such a way as to threaten the health care needs of the public,
or when applied in a discriminatory manner. Indeed, there is
ample precedent for invalidating "longstanding principles of
accepted insurer underwriting practices" in this country:
For example, federal law forbids classification by race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in employer sponsored
insurance plans. Many state statutes go beyond the federal law
and proscribe classification based on physical or mental
impairments or on a specific genetic trait. Such regulations
and statutes recognize that "actuarial justification does not
operate without limit" and that societal values may outweigh
statistical validity.224
220 Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d at 621.
221 Id. at 622.
222 See, e.g., Widiss, supra note 184, at 1642 ("Distinguishing among applicants,
in order to decide whether to issue coverage and the amount to be charged, is the
very essence of insurance underwriting. In general, the discrimination insurers
exercise in making such decisions is viewed as both necessary and acceptable.").
223 Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. v. Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d 615, 622 (3d Dep't 1990),
affd, 565 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1990).
224 Berman, supra note 176, at 1073; accord Bruner, supra note 183, at 1117
n.17 ("Regulations in all 50 states place limits upon discrimination among insureds,
and limits on insurance contracts evince a strong policy presumption against
allowing complete freedom of contract in the field of health insurance."); Joyce
Nixson Hoffman and Elizabeth Zieser Kincaid, AIDS: The Challenge to Life and
Health Insurers' Freedom of Contract, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 709, 720 (1986-87) ("The
ability of insurers to classify risks has also been limited in some states by laws and
regulations which prohibit unfair discrimination solely on the bases of sex, sexual
preference, marital status, physical and mental handicap, and certain genetic
traits."); Schatz, supra note 173, at 1798 ("[Glenetic traits for sickle cell anemia and
Tay-Sachs, like AIDS, are popularly associated with... groups that have long been
the targets of discrimination. The ban on the use of predictive tests for these
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Hence, while the use of traditional actuarial principles is
generally permitted, it is unacceptable where doing so would
threaten public health. It is also "invidious to do so if no rational
basis can be articulated for choosing AIDS as the one risk whose
cost we will not spread."225
In the face of new challenges presented by an epidemic such
as AIDS, courts must closely scrutinize "longstanding principles"
to assure that they do not jeopardize the health and the civil
rights of citizens. This is particularly true when the epidemic is
associated with groups traditionally subject to discrimination.
In this case, the executive branch took that lead; the judiciary
was sadly unwilling to face the challenge. 226
IV. NEW YORK STATE SOCIETY OF SURGEONS V.
AXELROD (1991)
A. Background
In New York State Society of Surgeons v. Axelrod,227 four
medical associations ("Petitioners") filed suit challenging the
New York State Commissioner of Health's (the "Commissioner")
refusal to designate HIV as a communicable disease and a
sexually transmissible disease pursuant to New York Public
Health Law sections 225(5)(h) and 2311.228 Such a designation
would have triggered the operation of statutes mandating
diseases ...reflects a laudable belief that medical tests must not be used to
discriminate against unpopular groups."); Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification:
Too Important to Be Left to the Actuaries, 19 U. MICH J. LEGAL REFORM 349, 367
(1986) ("A number of state statutes take an antidiscrimination approach in banning
classifications beyond race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Some statutes
proscribe classifications bases generally upon physical or mental impairment, a
specific disability, or genetic trait.").
225 Marcosson, supra note 183, at 397.
226 New York was not alone. Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s,
legislators in states that had banned the use of HIV tests by insurers swiftly moved
to repeal those bans. Currently, all 50 states allow insurers to test for HIV. See
William 0. Fabbri, Home HIV Testing and Conflicts with State HIV Testing
Regulations, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 419, 425 n.67 (1995); see also Bryan Ford, The
Uncertain Case for Market Pricing of Health Insurance, 74 B.U. L. REV. 109, 110 n.3
(1994); Karen S. Lovitch, State AIDS-Related Legislation in the 1990s: Adopting a
Language of Hope Which Affirms Life, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1187, 1210 (1996) ("Those
states that initially regulated the use of HIV antibody tests quickly limited or
repealed those provisions.").
227 N.Y. State Soc'y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605 (N.Y. 1991).
228 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 225(5)(h), 2311 (McKinney 1990).
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isolation and quarantine, name reporting, testing, and contact
tracing.229 Although Petitioners conceded that isolation and
quarantine were inappropriate for HIV illness, 230 they contended
that name reporting, mandatory testing, and contact tracing
were "crucial in controlling spread of HIV infection and
necessary to allow them to determine whether patients are
infected with the disease so that they [could] take appropriate
precautions during treatment."231 Petitioners alleged that the
Commissioner was mandated under law to designate HIV as a
communicable and sexually transmissible disease, and, in the
alternative, that his failure to do so was arbitrary and
capricious. An impressive group of public health experts
("Amici") joined the Commissioner in opposing this lawsuit,
including, among others, the American College Health
Association, the American Medical Students Association, the
American Nurses Association, the American Public Health
Association, the American Red Cross, and the Public Health
Association of New York City.232
The supreme court dismissed the case, a decision that the
Third Department voted to affirm by a margin of 3-2. The court
of appeals unanimously affirmed.
B. The Decision
The Court acknowledged that "HIV infection is a
communicable disease," and that it can be spread through sexual
contact. 233 The Court rejected Petitioners' assertion, however,
that the Public Health Laws required the Commissioner to
designate HIV as a communicable disease and a sexually
transmissible disease. Section 225(5)(h), the Court explained,
merely provides that the "sanitary code may * * * designate the
communicable diseases which are dangerous to the public
health."234 Nothing in the statute compelled the Commissioner
to list all communicable diseases, and "It]he Legislature's use of
the permissive word 'may'. . . supports the conclusion that the
229 Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d at 609.
230 Id. at 609; see infra note 242.
231 Id. at 608-09.
232 See Br. of Amici Curiae, N.Y. Soc'y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605
(N.Y. 1991) [hereinafter Amici].
233 Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d at 607.
234 Id. (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 225(5)(h) (McKinney 1990)).
2002]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
designation is left to the discretion of [the Commissioner] ."235
The Commissioner is vested with similar discretion under
section 2311 of the Public Health Law, which provides:
The commissioner shall promulgate a list of [STDs], such as
gonorrhea and syphilis, for the purposes of this article. The
commissioner, in determining the diseases to be included in
such list, shall consider those conditions principally
transmitted by sexual contact and the impact of particular
diseases on individual morbidity and the health of newborns. 236
This statute merely directs the Commissioner to "consider"
conditions transmitted by sexual contact, the Court observed,
providing the Commissioner with "the discretion to 'determin[e]
the diseases to be included in such list.' ",237 This discretion is
appropriate, the Court explained, because designation of the
disease would trigger provisions for isolation and quarantine,
name reporting, mandatory testing, and contact tracing,
"provisions which, for public health reasons, may not be
appropriate in dealing with every type of communicable or
sexually transmissible disease."238  The Commissioner had
determined, for example, that the public health would not be
served by placing influenza, a communicable disease, or
chlamydia, a sexually transmissible disease, on the list.239
Turning to Petitioners' argument that the Commissioner's
decision was arbitrary and capricious, the Court explained: "We
cannot substitute our judgment for that of qualified experts in
the field of public health unless their judgment is 'without
justification.' "240 Accordingly, the Court's review was "limited to
whether respondents' determination is rationally based, i.e.,
whether it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious." 241
As noted, Petitioners conceded that isolation and quarantine
were inappropriate for dealing with HIV and AIDS.242 State
235 Id.
236 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2311 (McKinney 1990) (emphasis added).
237 Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d at 608 (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2311
(McKinney 1990)).
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 609 (citation omitted).
241 Id. (citations omitted). As we shall see, the Court would subsequently rely
upon Axelrod for the proposition that the duly formulated determination of a
governmental entity may not be challenged on any grounds, a proposition that
Axelrod plainly does not support. See infra notes 405-14 and accompanying text.
242 In their brief, the Amici argued that, notwithstanding Petitioners'
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officials already had access to reported cases of HIV infection, 243
moreover, narrowing the question on appeal to whether the
determination to forego contact tracing and mandatory testing
was rational. On this question, the Court credited the
Commissioner's conclusion:
[A]s a practical matter, mandatory testing and contact tracing
will not lead to control and prevention because many persons
infected with HIV are not tested until their symptoms become
apparent and symptoms may not develop for many years. In
the interim, between infection and the appearance of
symptoms, an individual may have multiple needle sharing,
sexual contacts or both. These factors would make contact
tracing, without the voluntary cooperation of the infected
individuals, an almost impossible task. Moreover, HIV
antibodies may take months to develop and infected individuals
who have not yet developed antibodies may be capable of
carrying and transmitting the disease. Thus, while contact
tracing has historically been a useful public health tool in
stemming epidemics of readily discoverable communicable
diseases which have a short incubation period, that is not the
nature of HIV infections.244
The Court also credited the Commissioner's conclusion,
firmly supported by the Amici, that "mandatory testing and
contact tracing would prevent individuals with HIV infection
from cooperating with public health officials,"245 because
individuals living with. HIV "have strong reasons to avoid
concession, "the quarantine provisions of Article 21 remain in effect and would
permit a magistrate to 'commit [an infected individual] to any hospital or institution
established for the care of persons suffering from any such communicable disease or
maintaining a room, ward, or wards for such persons.'" Amici, supra note 232, at
15 (quoting N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2120(3) (McKinney 1990)). The Amici argued
that "[tihe mere fact that Article 21 would permit such quarantining provides
sufficient justification alone for denying Petitioners' relief." Id. at 24. For a
discussion of the issue of quarantine and HIV/AIDS, see Ronald Bayer, Controlling
AIDS in Cuba: The Logic of Quarantine, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1022 (1989); Nancy
L. Ford & Michael Q. Quam, AIDS Quarantine, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 353 (1987); John
A. Gleason, Quarantine: An Unreasonable Solution to the AIDS Dilemma, 55 U.
CIN. L. REV. 217 (1986); Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory
State Powers, Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1017 .(1989);
Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of An Archaic Doctrine, 14
HOFSTRA L. REV. 53 (1985).
243 See Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d at 609.
244 See id.
245 Id.
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disclosing that they have AIDS or HIV infection."246 Disclosure
for such individuals "can result in discrimination in housing,
employment and health care. '247 Accordingly, the Commissioner
determined that "counseling and voluntary cooperation are
essential to alter private sexual and drug abuse practices which
spread HIV infection," and cooperation and counseling will only
occur if persons living with AIDS "are assured that testing will
not be coerced and that their test results will remain
confidential."248
The Court also explained that the Commissioner's approach
was "in accord with the State policy underlying article 27-F of
the Public Health Law, a statute enacted to promote voluntary
testing for HIV infection."249 As Governor Cuomo emphasized in
signing the new law:
By enacting this bill, New York rejects coercive measures. As
experience in other states has shown, mandatory testing of
broad population groups is neither effective nor desirable. 250
Experience in other states has also shown that without effective
assurances of confidentiality, voluntary testing efforts fail. The
fight against AIDS can be won only with the voluntary
cooperation of all our citizens, especially those most at risk.25 1
246 Id.
247 Id. The Amici pointed out, for example, that "New York City's Human
Rights Commission has received more than 4,000 AIDS-related complaints of
discrimination since 1983." Amici, supra note 232, at 21 (citation omitted).
248 Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d at 609.
249 Id. at 610; see N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2780 (McKinney 1990).
250 Id. In California, for example, the Prevent AIDS Now Initiative Committee
("PANIC"), a political arm of Lyndon LaRouche, attempted in 1986 to implement
mandatory procedures similar to those proposed by the Petitioners in Axelrod. See
BAYER, supra note 3, at 147-153. Proposition 64, the LaRouche referendum,
required that AIDS be defined as an "infectious, contagious and communicable
disease," and that the condition of living with HIV be defined as an infectious,
contagious, and communicable condition. Id. at 147-48. In addition, both HIV and
AIDS were to be listed by the Department of Health Services as reportable diseases.
Id. at 148. The proposition was opposed by "the entire medical establishment," the
deans of four California schools of public health, the state's major newspapers, and
a broad spectrum of social service organizations, and several mainstream
politicians, and was soundly defeated. See id. at 149-50; Dennis Altman,
Legitimation Through Disaster: AIDS and the Gay Movement, in AIDS: THE
BURDENS OF HISTORY 301, 307 (Elizabeth Fee & Daniel M. Fox eds., 1988) ("[Iln
California's November 1986 elections a group associated with Lyndon LaRouche
proposed a measure to quarantine those who test antibody positive; it was defeated
after gay and medical groups mounted a major campaign against it-supported by
almost all mainstream politicians.").
251 Bill Jacket, L. 1988, ch. 584, Governor's Memorandum in approval, dated
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Article 27-F, passed in 1988, requires written, informed
consent prior to administering an HIV test: "[N]o person shall
order the performance of an HIV related test without first
receiving the written, informed consent of the subject of the
test.. -252 In addition, Article 27-F places strict limitations on
contact tracing,25 3 provides for anonymous testing,254 and assures
the confidentiality of test results and HIV status.255  "No
comparable protections are provided to an individual once the
disease has been listed as communicable or sexually
transmissible."25 6  Thus, Petitioners' desire for mandatory
testing and contact tracing was clearly at odds with the
Legislature's goal of expanding voluntary testing through the
assurance of anonymous testing and confidentiality.
The Court noted, finally, that the Commissioner's approach
was supported by leading health authorities, including the
United States Centers for Disease Control 257 and the Institute of
Medicine, National Academy of Science. 258  Both of these
respected organizations had concluded, like the Commissioner,
that mandatory testing and contact tracing were inappropriate
to stem the spread of the HIV virus.259 The Commissioner thus
had ample justification for his conclusion that the provisions
triggered by designation of HIV were "ineffective and impractical
Sept. 1, 1988, 1988 McKinney's Session Laws of N.Y., at 2284.
252 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2781(1) (McKinney 1990).
253 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2782(4) (McKinney 1990). As the Court
explained, this provision "permits physicians to warn an identified contact if they
believe the contact is in danger, but precludes the physician from revealing the
subject's identity." Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d at 610.
254 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2781(4) (McKinney 1990) (requiring that test
subjects be provided with "an opportunity to remain anonymous ... through use of a
coded system with no linking of individual identity to the test request or results").
255 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2781(4), 2782(1) (McKinney 1990) ("No
person who obtains confidential HIV related information in the course of providing
any health or social service or pursuant to a release of confidential HIV related
information may disclose or be compelled to disclose such information ....
256 Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d at 610.
257 See id. (citing CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Public
Health Service Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to Prevent HIV
Infection and AIDS, 36 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 509 (Aug. 14,
1987)).
258 See id. (citing INSTITUTE FOR MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
Confronting AIDS-Directions for Public Health, Health Care, and Research 218-
249 (1986)).
259 See id.
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in dealing with [the illness] .-260
The Court's decision in Axelrod was firmly based on the
prevailing public health consensus. 261 "Voluntarist at its core,"
Ronald Bayer explained, "it was a consensus marked by an
appreciation of the gravity of the AIDS epidemic and a
recognition of the very limited role that coercive public health
measures could play in the years ahead."262 As the Court
recognized, the experts concluded that coercive measures could
deter individuals at risk from testing or seeking counseling,
thereby "subverting the prospects for the broad scale
modification of private behavior so central to any effective
campaign against AIDS."263 It was thus with little exaggeration
260 Id.at 609.
261 For a comprehensive, contemporaneous discussion of this issue, see BAYER,
supra note 3; see also WILLIAM CURRAN, AIDS: LEGAL AND REGULATORY POLICY
(1988); Allan M. Brandt, AIDS: From Social History to Social Policy, in AIDS: THE
BURDENS OF HISTORY 147, 160 (Elizabeth Fee et al. eds., 1988) ("Mandatory
screening could therefore have the effect of creating an underground epidemic in
which infected individuals, fearing discrimination, isolation, or quarantine, refuse to
cooperate with public health officials. Hidden infection is the nemesis of any
effective campaign to halt an epidemic disease."); Scott Burris, "Testing, Disclosure,
and the Right to Privacy," in SCOTT BURRIS ET AL., AIDS LAW TODAY 115, 121
(1993).
The public health consensus in support of privacy protections against
coercion led a majority of states to adopt measures in the late 1980s
governing HIV testing and confidentiality. By the end of 1991, thirty-six
states had enacted legislation requiring informed consent for HIV testing,
and virtually every state provided some degree of protection for the
confidentiality of HIV information.
Id.; Mary E. Clark, AIDS Prevention: Legislative Options, 16 AM. J. L. & MED. 107,
134 (1990) ("Mandatory reporting of positive HIV antibody test results will not
necessarily provide a more fully developed epidemiological picture of the population
of individuals with HIV infection than is currently available. The decision to
undergo HIV antibody testing is generally a voluntary one, and should remain so.");
Michael L. Closen, HIV-AIDS in the 1990s, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 239, 240-41
(1994) ("[Mledical care experts roundly view mandatory HIV-testing statutes as
contrary to sound health care goals"); Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Case Against
Compulsory Casefinding in Controlling AIDS, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 8, 53 (1986) ("In
the absence of evidence that compulsory testing, screening, and reporting alters
behavior more effectively than voluntary education and counseling programs,
federal and state public health authorities should design their strategies and devote
their resources toward voluntary services for groups vulnerable to HIV."); Gostin,
supra note 242, at 1019 ("Public health authorities have resisted political and public
pressure for the use of coercive powers.").
262 BAYER, supra note 3, at 134. Dr. Bayer was a signatory to the brief of the
Amici in Axelrod. See Amici, supra note 232, at 1, 4.
263 BAYER, supra note 3, at 134. Several contemporaneous studies had reported,
for example, that mandatory measures would deter testing for HIV. See, e.g., Laura
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that the Amici informed the Court: "Virtually all public health
experts recommend voluntary HIV testing programs like the one
the Commissioner has implemented in New York State."264
The Commissioner's strategy was expressly endorsed by the
New York State Legislature, moreover, which articulated the
purpose of Article 27-F in the preamble of the Act:
By providing additional protection of the confidentiality of HIV
related information, the legislature intends to encourage the
expansion of voluntary confidential testing for the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) so that individuals may come
forward, learn their health status, make decisions regarding
the appropriate treatment, and change the behavior that puts
them and other at risk of infection.265
The Commissioner's strategy was thus the very antithesis of
arbitrary or "without justification";266 his strategy was carefully
constructed and consonant with both prevailing public health
wisdom and the express intent of the New York State
Legislature.
Notably, however, in two previous lawsuits, appellants had
asked the Court to recognize the wisdom of the Commissioner's
voluntary strategy. And in both decisions, Doe in 1987 and
Corcoran in 1990, the Court had refused. In Doe, the Court
rejected appellants' argument that the decision to classify AIDS
Fehrs et al; Trial of Anonymous Versus Confidential Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Testing, 2 LANCET 379, 381 (1988) (citing an Oregon study finding that "the
option of anonymity seem[ed] to have increased testing by 50% overall and- by 125%
among gay men"); E. Fordyce et al., Mandatory Reporting of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Testing Would Deter Blacks and Hispanics from Being
Tested, 262 J.A.M.A. 349 (1989); Susan M. Kegles et al., Mandatory Reporting of
HIV Testing Would Deter Gay Men from Being Tested, 261 JAMA 1246, 1275 (1989);
Rose Weitz, Anonymity in Testing for HIV Antibodies: Desired Option, 81 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1212, 1213 (1991) ("The most common reason given for not getting
tested (mentioned by 50% of untested persons) was not wanting the state to learn if
they tested positive. In addition, 36% mentioned fear of discrimination if others
learned they had been tested.").
264 Amici, supra note 232, at 18; accord Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 724 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1988) ("Existing regulations and laws, as well as the stated policy of
responsible Health Departments and health officials demonstrate a public policy...
unalterably opposed to judicially coerced non-voluntary testing."); S. REP. NO. 101-
116, at 8 (1989) ("[Als long as discrimination occurs, and no strong national policy
with rapid and effective remedies against discrimination is established, individuals
who are infected with HIV will be reluctant to come forward for testing, counseling
and care.").
265 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2780 et seq. (McKinney 1998).
266 See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
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as a communicable disease was arbitrary and capricious.
"Regardless of the Health Department's regulations," the Court
ruled, "it is agreed that AIDS can be transmitted from person to
person by direct exposure to blood, semen or breast milk. That
being so, AIDS is routinely viewed as a communicable
disease."267  The plurality proceeded to uphold the prison
authorities' compulsory and punitive policy, deferring to public
authorities with no expert basis. As we have seen, that policy
was antithetical to the Commissioner's well-founded public
health strategy.268
In Corcoran, the Court even more explicitly rejected the
Commissioner's voluntary strategy. Just one year before the
Court would unanimously decide Axelrod, the Court
unanimously rejected the Commissioner's conclusion that the
use of mandatory HIV testing in insurance contracts was
contrary to the health care needs of the public. In fact, the Court
adopted the Third Department's decision, which harshly
dismissed the Commissioner's voluntary strategy as merely
"further[ing] the Commissioner of Health's own objectives in
public health."269
It is ironic, then, that just one year later, the Court would
acknowledge in Axelrod that the Commissioner's strategy was
rational and supported both by the consensus of public health
experts and the New York State Legislature.270 The soundness
of the Axelrod decision merely highlights the errors of the Court
in Doe and Corcoran.
267 Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536, 544 (N.Y. 1987) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
268 See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
269 565 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1990).
270 Although New York continues to eschew mandatory testing, in 1998, the
New York State Senate enacted a name reporting and partner notification law,
amending Article 21 of the Public Health Law. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2130
(McKinney 1999); see also Sonia Bhatnager, HI V Name Reporting and Partner
Notification in New York State, 26 FORD URB. L.J. 1457 (1999). The law continues to
allow individuals to opt for anonymous testing. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2138
(McKinney 1999). The move to name reporting and partner notification has been
attributed, inter alia, to advances in AIDS medication. See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, HIV Surveillance and Name Reporting: A Public Health Case for
Protecting Civil Liberties (Oct. 1997), available at
http://www.aclu.org/issues/aids/namereport.html ("Renewed calls for HIV
surveillance are at least partly the result of new developments in the AIDS
epidemic, primarily the emergence of promising new medical treatments.");
Bhatnager, supra note 270, at 1460.
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V. NORTH SHORE UNIVERSTIY HOSPITAL V. ROSA (1995)
A. Background
In North Shore University Hospital v. Rosa,271 patient David
Martell ("Martell") was subjected to heightened precautionary
measures by the North Shore University Hospital dental clinic
("North Shore") because he was thought to be gay, and thus
thought to be at greater risk of transmitting the HIV virus. 272
On three occasions in 1985, Martell visited North Shore. On the
first visit, Martell was treated without incident. During
Martell's second visit, Martell was questioned about his sexual
orientation, any history of intravenous drug use, and infection
with HIV or other illnesses. Martell became upset with these
questions and left without receiving treatment. Martell
returned for a third time in 1985, however, and was treated in
accordance with North Shore's "strict isolation techniques." The
physicians treating Martell wore two sets of gloves, masks,
goggles, full-body disposable gowns, and caps.27 3 In addition,
some of the equipment was draped in plastic, and an orange
"x " 274 was taped over the "isolated room,"275 at the end of a dark
hallway,27 6 in which Martell was treated. The Court noted that
the quality of service provided to Martell was otherwise "no
different from that given other patients."277
In December of 1985, Martell filed a complaint with the New
York State Division of Human Rights (DHR) alleging that he
was denied equal privileges at a public accommodation because
he was perceived as being a member of a high-risk group and
thus perceived as having a disability (Martell maintained that
he was neither gay nor living with HIV).278 A hearing was
conducted before an Administrative Law Judge (AL), who
27, 657 N.E.2d 483 (N.Y. 1995).
272 Id.
273 Id. at 484.
274 The Court omitted to mention that the "x" was orange, stating only that it
was "small." Id. at 483. The color of the "x" is described in the appellate division
decision. N. Shore Univ. Hosp. v. Rosa, 600 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (2d Dep't 1993).
275 Rosa, 657 N.E.2d at 485.
276 Id. Judge Smith did not mention the fact that Martell was treated "at the
end of a dark hallway" in his initial recitation of the facts; he mentioned it later, in
describing Martell's complaint. Id. at 484.
277 Id. at 483.
278 Id. at 485.
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determined that North Shore discriminated against Martell
because of his perceived disability; that the "isolation treatment"
caused Martell unnecessary embarrassment and humiliation;
and that North Shore's infectious disease protocol constituted an
illegal discriminatory practice. 279 Adopting a number of the
ALJ's findings, the Commissioner of DHR ordered North Shore,
inter alia, to cease using a dental protocol based upon a patient's
perceived disability; to pay Martell $25,000 in compensation for
his mental anguish; to educate its staff on the transmission of
HIV/AIDS; and to utilize universal infection precautions for all
patients. 280 Both the appellate division and court of appeals
voted unanimously to annul the Commissioner's determination.
B. The Decision
Judge Smith began this 1995 opinion by noting, "In 1985,
the knowledge of medical professionals regarding the contraction
and transmission of AIDS was by all accounts limited."28 ' In the
early to mid-1980s, Judge Smith explained, "[Tihe perception
was that simply being a member of specific groups or classes was
a tell-tale sign that an individual was at a greater risk of
contracting and transmitting the disease."28 2  North Shore
developed its protocol "some time around 1983," prior to the
release of the Centers for Disease Control's (CDC)
"Recommended Infection Control Practices for Dentistry" in
April 1986.283 North Shore did, however, consult sources from
the CDC and the American Dental Association. 284 Pursuant to
North Shore's protocol, "strict isolation techniques" were utilized
for persons testing positive for HIV or hepatitis B, intravenous
drug users, patients who had received multiple blood
transfusions, hemodialysis patients, persons suffering from
mononucleosis or tuberculosis, homosexual men, and
prostitutes. 28 5
279 Id. at 484.
280 Id. at 485.
281 Id. at 484.
282 Id. at 484.
283 Id. (citing CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Recommended
Infection-Control Practices for Dentistry, 35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
237 (April 18, 1986)); see infra notes 302-04 and accompanying text.
284 Rosa, 657 N.E.2d at 484.
285 Id. at 483.
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Judge Smith explained that Martell established a prima
facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifted to North
Shore to rebut the presumption of discrimination by showing a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the differential
treatment.2 6 The Court ruled that North Shore did this "by
showing that at the relevant time, its protocol was reasonable,
medically warranted and consistent with its desire to protect
patients and staff from the spread of infectious diseases."28 7
Quite simply, North Shore demonstrated that its protocol was
based upon "prevailing medical perceptions at the time," and
was not merely a pretext for discrimination.288 Indeed, "the
evidence shows that infection control practices similar to [North
Shore's] were widespread in dental offices in the early 1980s."289
Accordingly, the Commissioner's finding "was not supported by
substantial evidence," and was correctly annulled by the
Appellate Division. 290
At first blush, the decision to observe heightened
precautions in the age of AIDS appears both reasonable and
medically appropriate. The problem is that the Court
sweepingly included, under the same broad brush, practices that
were "based upon prevailing medical knowledge"291 and those
that not were not medically justified and thus objectionable.
Specifically, the Court cited no medical justification for North
Shore's practice of treating suspected at-risk patients "in an
isolated room located at the end of a dark hallway," or for placing
a conspicuous orange "x7 over the door of the isolated room.
Indeed, in 1983, when North Shore developed its protocol, the
CDC issued guidelines for clinical personnel who work with
patients known or suspected to be living with HIV.292 The CDC
recommended the use of gloves, masks, and protective eyewear
when performing dental or oral surgical procedures;
conspicuously absent was any recommendation concerning
isolation or blatant identification, such as North Shore
286 Id. at 485.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 486.
289 Id.
290 Id. at 485.
291 Id.
292 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Precautions for Health-Care Workers and
Allied Professionals, 32 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 450 (Sept. 2, 1983).
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utilized.293  North Shore's unnecessary practices not only
unfairly stigmatized patients, but the practice of identifying
selected patients with an orange "Scarlett letter" over the
treating room door threatened wrongfully to identify such
patient as potentially living with HIV.
Under established New York law, the standard for reviewing
an administrative determination such as the Commissioner's is
(and was at the time) quite low. The determination must be
upheld "[w]hen a rational basis for the conclusion approved by
the division is found."294  As the Court has emphasized,
moreover, "[Tihe division's expertise in evaluating
discrimination claims and formulating appropriate remedies
may not be lightly disregarded in view of its wide discretion,
legislatively endowed, to weigh and assess the conduct of the
parties and to reach conclusions based on what is fairly inferable
from the facts."295 Hence, "where there is room for choice,
neither the weight which might be accorded nor the choice which
might be made by a court are germane upon an analysis for the
presence of substantial evidence before the commissioner."296
Under these governing standards, the unnecessary
stigmatization caused by North Shore's selective use of "strict
isolation techniques," and of the orange "x," provided ample
grounds for upholding the Commissioner's finding.297
A companion case decided by the Court on the very same
day as the North Shore decision, underscores the uniquely
objectionable nature of North Shore's practices. In Syracuse
Community Health Center v. Wendi A.,298 petitioner complained
of the dental staffs use of protective gear and the draping of
exposed surfaces in the treatment room. In annulling the
293 Id.
294 CUNY-Hostos Cmty. Coll. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 449 N.E.2d
1251, 1254 (N.Y. 1983).
295 State Office of Drug Abuse Serv. v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 397
N.E.2d 1314, 1318 (N.Y. 1979).
296 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 379 N.E.2d 1183,
1185 (N.Y. 1978).
297 See Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72, 78 (N.D. Ohio 1994) ("Discrimination in
public accommodation can take the form of the denial of the opportunity to receive
medical treatment, segregation unnecessary for the provision of effective medical
treatment, unnecessary screening or eligibility requirements for treatment, or
provision of unequal medical benefits based upon the disability.") (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
298 659 N.E.2d 760 (N.Y. 1995).
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Commissioner's finding of discrimination, the appellate division
emphasized that "the treatment rooms are not visible from the
waiting area, that the doors to the treatment rooms are kept
closed except when staff members go in and out, and that no one
but the patient and clinic staff members were aware that the
precaution of draping had been utilized."299 The court expressly
stated that respondent's actions were not discriminatory because
they were taken "in the privacy of the treatment room in the
case of an identified HIV positive patient."300  This is
fundamentally different, and less onerous, than the practices
utilized by North Shore.
A more difficult issue is the Court's acceptance of North
Shore's argument that, in light of the prevailing medical
consensus in 1985, it was permissible to subject only certain
classes of patients for heightened precautions.30 Had the events
in question occurred just one year later, there would have been
no question that North Shore's practices were contrary to the
prevailing medical consensus. As the Court noted, in the CDC's
April 1986 "Recommended Infection-Control Practices for
Dentistry,"30 2 the CDC advised dentists to utilize universal
precautions30 3 for all patients in light of the fact that "all infected
patients cannot be identified by history, physical examination, or
readily available laboratory tests."30 4 The Surgeon General of
the United States repeated this advice in a 1987 report, also
299 Syracuse Cmty. Health Ctr. v. Wendi A., 604 N.Y.S.2d 406, 407 (4th Dep't
1993).
300 Id.
301 N. Shore Univ. Hosp. v. Rosa, 657 N.E.2d 483, 484 (N.Y. 1995). The Court
explained:
[Iln the early to mid 1980s, the perception was that simply being a member
of specific groups or classes was a tell-tale sign that an individual was at a
greater risk of contracting and transmitting the disease. Subsequent
research, however, revealed that life-style and behavior patterns played a
substantial role in an individual's contracting the AIDS disease.
Id.
302 See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
303 Under "universal precautions," the blood and certain body fluids of all
patients are considered potentially infectious for the HIV virus, hepatitis B virus,
and other bloodborne pathogens. Universal precautions are intended to prevent
exposure to these pathogens. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
Perspectives in Disease Prevention and Health Promotion Update: Universal
Precautions for Prevention of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus,
Hepatitis B Virus, and Other Bloodborne Pathogens in Health-Care Settings, 37
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 377 (June 24, 1988).
304 Id.
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cited by the Court, 30 5  as did the CDC in its uncited
"Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in
Health-Care Settings,"306 which advised: "Since medical history
and examination cannot reliably identify all patients infected
with HIV or other blood-borne pathogens, blood and body-fluid
precautions should be consistently used for ALL patients."307
The Court concluded that in 1985, before these documents
were issued, North Shore simply could not have been required,
under prevailing medical standards, to utilize universal
precautions, i.e., to treat all patients with the same
precautionary measures. As the Court itself noted, however,
"the American Dental Association issued guidelines regarding
infection control recommending universal precautions as early as
1977."308 This would have removed the stigma that North Shore
reserved for those even suspected of living with HIV, or of being
gay, among other things.30 9 Additionally, of course, it would
have reduced the potential for unwitting transmission of HIV,
hepatitis B, 310 and other bloodborne pathogens. 311 In a 1985
report cited in passing by the Court, moreover, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (DOH) also
recommended utilizing "routine" precautions to prevent the
305 Rosa, 657 N.E.2d at 484 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON AIDS (1987)).
306 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Recommendations for
Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 36 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1 (Aug. 21, 1987).
307 Id.
308 Rosa, 657 N.E.2d at 484 (emphasis added).
309 See World News Tonight with Peter Jennings (ABC television broadcast,
March 8, 1990) ("Universal precautions takes the pressure off health care workers
to treat patients differently. That means no single patient is the object of medical
discrimination and that all patients are handled with healthy and appropriate
caution."). In Syracuse Community Health Center, in contrast to North Shore, the
dental staff "took universal precautions with all patients," and draped exposed
surfaces only "[w]hen the staff knew that a patient was HIV positive ... " Syracuse
Cmty. Health Ctr. v. Wendi A., 604 N.Y.S.2d 406, 406 (4th Dep't 1993).
310 See John H. Lewis, Protect All Hospital Workers from AIDS, WASHINGTON
POST, Sept. 27, 1988, at A20 ("Universal precautions protect workers from all blood-
borne diseases, especially Hepatitis B, which causes significantly more deaths
among health care workers annually than AIDS.").
311 See Scott Burris, Dental Discrimination Against the HIV-Infected: Empirical
Data, Law and Public Policy, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 8 (1996) ("[Llong-standing
guidelines have established a system of universal precautions applicable to all
patients regardless of HIV status. Widely adopted by dentists, these precautions
have dramatically reduced occupational exposures to patient blood.").
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spread of HIV, herpes, and hepatitis, explaining that "[b]ecause
not all infected patients can be identified by history,
examination, or readily available laboratory tests, the following
precautions are best adopted routinely."312 Nonetheless, the
Court decided that the ADA and DOH guidelines did not reflect
the prevailing wisdom, and thus that North Shore's practices
were grounded in the existing consensus.
Under the Court's decision in Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases
North General Hospital, Inc.,313 however, the question whether
North Shore's protocol was medically justified should have been
decided by a finder of fact. In Elaine W., the Court established
that "[a] factfinder will have to resolve whether [respondent's]
policy is justified by sound medical opinion." 314 The Court also
noted that "[t]he mere proffering of a medical explanation, when
disputed by other evidence, does not validate [respondent's] ...
policy."315  Under Elaine W., then, the Court should have
remanded the case to the Commissioner, as the finder of fact, for
a more exacting determination whether the specific procedures
utilized by North Shore were medically justified. A remand
would have revealed, at the very least, that North Shore's
isolation techniques were unjustified and thus discriminatory.
Like Doe and. Corcoran, however, and in stark contrast to Ware,
the Court assumed on its own the role of factfinder to invalidate
a decision taken on behalf of persons living with, or suspected of
living with, HIV. The Court not only failed to defer to the
Commissioner, as it did in Doe, but it failed even to remand for
further factual findings, as in Ware.
Finally, North Shore underscores the need for sexual
orientation protection in New York State.316 The policy of
singling out gay patients for strict isolation techniques was
blatantly discriminatory; there was certainly no proof in the
record that Martell was HIV positive. North Shore's only
grounds for singling out Martell was the suspicion that he was
312 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN Svcs., Preventing the Transmission of
Hepatitis B, AIDS, and Herpes in Dentistry 1, 7 (1985). The Report also noted, inter
alia: "In some cases, the carriers of viruses associated with these diseases cannot
clearly be identified by dental personnel who may unknowingly be exposed to AIDS,
herpes, and hepatitis B." Id. at 1.
313 613 N.E.2d 523 (N.Y. 1993).
314 Id. at 525.
315 Id. at 524.
316 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1993 and Supp. 2000).
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gay. Yet, the Court cited no evidence for the proposition that a
large percentage of the gay community is (or was) living with
HIV and AIDS. In fact, "[tihere is no evidence to support such
an assertion."317 The mere fact that such practices may have
been "widespread,"318  moreover, does not justify this
discriminatory practice.
The case of Doe v. District of Columbia Commission on
Human Rights 319 is elucidating on this point. In Washington,
D.C., where discrimination based upon sexual orientation is
expressly prohibited, 320 medical staff unlawfully drew and tested
petitioner's blood on the suspicion that he was gay. In addition,
hospital staff utilized "blood and body fluid precautions" in light
of the fact that petitioner "had a history of sexually transmitted
diseases and suffered from hepatitis."321 Because the use of
heightened precautions was "based upon petitioner's medical
history,"322 the D.C. Court of Appeals (D.C.'s highest court)
concluded that "the hospital implemented blood and body
precautions based on valid medical concerns, rather than on
petitioner's sexual orientation."323 In a concurrence, Associate
Judge Ferren commented:
I want to emphasize that nothing in the majority opinion
should be understood to support an argument that sexual
orientation, without a medical history of sexually transmitted
diseases, can serve as a proper basis for any discriminatory
treatment. Nor, as I see it, can sexual orientation properly be
considered even a high risk factor absent such a medical
history. Any reference to homosexuality in this case as a high
risk factor, therefore, is relevant only because of the history of
sexually transmitted diseases.324
Although the events in Doe v. District occurred in 1987, this
principle is equally applicable to North Shore. In a just society,
mere membership in a group alleged to disproportionately
exhibit a trait cannot, without more, justify disparate treatment
317 Bruner, supra note 183, at 1126 n.55; see Schatz, supra note 173, at 1783
("AIDS is not a 'gay disease.' According to current projections, the vast majority of
gay and bisexual men will not develop AIDS."); Li, supra note 10, at 477-78.
318 N. Shore Univ. Hosp. v. Rosa, 657 N.E.2d 483, 486 (N.Y. 1995).
319 624 A.2d 440 (D.C. 1993).
320 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 (1981).
321 Doe, 624 A.D.2d at 445.
322 Id.
323 Id. at 446.
324 Id. at 448 (Ferren, J., concurring).
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of individuals from that group.325 As the Court observed in
Elaine W., "[A] generalization may not serve to validate
prohibited discrimination." 326 This is particularly the case when
the group in question is, like gay Americans, a group subjected to
widespread societal prejudice.
VI. CAHILL v. ROSA (1996)
A. Background
In Cahill v. Rosa,327 the Court examined the question
whether private dental offices are "place[s] of public
accommodation" under the New York State Human Rights
Law.328  In two separate cases, consolidated on appeal,
complainants alleged that defendants discriminated against
them, in violation of the Human Rights Law, by refusing to treat
them because they were known or suspected to be living with
HIV. In each case, following administrative proceedings, an
Administrative Law Judge sustained the complainant's charges
and awarded compensatory damages for mental anguish.3 29 The
Commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights
(the "Commissioner") adopted these findings. 330 The Appellate
Division, Second Department (the "Second Department"), voted
unanimously to annul each of the Commissioner's rulings.3 31 In
325 Nor can the cost of treating such individuals justify disparate treatment. In
a 1993 decision, the Seventh Circuit explained that the cost of implementing
universal precautions "can hardly be thought so great as to imperil dentistry.
Annualized, these costs are estimated to be equal to less than one-third of one
percent of the industry's annual revenues." Am. Dental Ass'n. v. Martin, 984 F.2d
823, 829 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Martha A. Field, Testing for AIDS: Uses and
Abuses, 16 AM J.L. & MED. 34, 63 (1990) ("From a point of view of medical safety as
well as from a civil liberties viewpoint, society is better served by adopting
universalist solutions and preventive measures for everyone to follow to avoid
infection.").
326 Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases N. General Hosp., Inc., 613 N.E.2d 523, 526 n.2
(N.Y. 1993); see also id. at 526 ("As the Supreme Court has said: '[elven a true
generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an
individual to whom the generalization does not apply.' ") (alteration in original)
(quoting L. A. Dep't of Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978)).
327 674 N.E.2d 274 (N.Y. 1996).
328 N.Y. ExEc LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1993 and Supp. 2000).
329 Cahill, 674 N.E.2d at 274.
330 See Cahill v. Rosa, 632 N.Y.S.2d 614, 615 (2d Dep't 1995); Lasser v. Rosa,
634 N.Y.S.2d 188 (2d Dep't 1995).
33' See Cahill, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 614; Lasser, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
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a sharply divided 4-3 decision, the Court reversed the Second
Department's decisions.
B. The Decision
Under the Human Rights Law, it is "an unlawful
discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee,
proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any
place of public accommodation. .. because of the...
disability.., of any person... to refuse, withhold from or deny
to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities
or privileges thereof."3 2  The term "place of public
accommodation" is specifically defined in section 292(9) of the
law, which lists places that are and are not included in the
definition.333 Among the places included in the definition are
"wholesale and retail stores and establishments dealing with
goods or services of any kind."334
Defendants raised two main points to support their
argument that dental offices are not places of public
accommodation under the statute. First, they asserted that
dental offices are not included in the statutory list of public
accommodations; hence, under the doctrine of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius,335 the Legislature did not intend to include
dental offices within the statutory definition. Second, they
contended that the statutory phrase "wholesale and retail"
modifies the phrase "stores and establishments dealing with
goods or services of any kind," and because dental offices are not
wholesale or retail establishments, they are not covered by the
332 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(a) (McKinney 1993 and Supp. 2000).
333 Section 292(9) states:
The term "place of public accommodation, resort or amusement" shall
include, except as hereinafter specified, all places included in the meaning
of such terms as: inns, taverns, road houses, hotels, motels... ; buffets,
saloons, barrooms...; wholesale and retail stores and establishments
dealing with goods or services of any kind, dispensaries, clinics, hospitals,
bath-houses, swimming pools, laundries .... Such term shall not include
public libraries, kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, high
schools, academies, colleges and universities...; or any institution, club or
place of accommodation which proves that it is in its nature distinctly
private.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) (McKinney 1993 and Supp. 2000).
334 Id.
335 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990)
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statute.336
Tellingly, the Court announced that "[alnalysis starts by
recognizing that the provisions of the Human Rights Law must
be liberally construed to accomplish the purposes of the
statute."337 In North Shore, the Court neither began its analysis
with this statutory maxim nor even cited the maxim in its
decision. Addressing defendants' first argument, the Court
observed that the statute utilizes "broad and inclusive language"
in setting forth the list of included places. "The prefatory
sentence [to the Human Rights Law]," the Court observed,
"states that '[tihe term "place of public accommodation, resort or
amusement" shall include, except as hereinafter specified, all
places included in the meaning of such terms as.' "338 The list
that follows this broad language, moreover, "is illustrative, not
specific."339 The omission of dental offices from the illustrative
list of places included was thus in no way dispositive.
The omission of dental offices from the narrow list of
exempted places was, by contrast, significant. As the Court
explained, the "narrow and restrictive language identifying
[places exempted] stands in stark contrast to the expansive
language identifying those included within the definition of a
'place of public accommodation.' "340 This indicates that the
Legislature intended that the inclusive list be broadly construed,
and the exemptions narrowly construed. The omission of dental
offices from the list of places exempted therefore suggests that
the Legislature did not intend their exemption.
Similarly, because the Court was called upon to determine
whether dental offices were "included in the meaning" of the
enumerated places, the doctrine of expressio unius was
inapplicable. The Legislative History supports this liberal
interpretation. As the Court explained, the Legislature has
repeatedly amended the statute to expand its scope, and in 1960,
it deleted a limiting phrase from the statute. Hence, "the
336 Cahill v. Rosa, 674 N.E.2d 274, 276 (N.Y. 1996).
337 Id. (citing U.S. Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 452
N.E.2d. 1199, 1204 (N.Y. 1983); City of Schenectady v. State Div. of Hum. Rights,
335 N.E.2d 290, 295 (N.Y. 1975)).
338 Id. at 276 (quoting N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) (McKinney 1993 and Supp.
2000)).
339 Id.
340 Id. at 277 (quoting N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) (McKixmey 1993 and Supp.
2000)).
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Legislature used the phrase place of public accommodation in
the broad sense of providing conveniences and services to the
public,"341 and it "intended that the definition of place of
accommodation should be interpreted liberally."342
Turning to defendants' second argument, the Court
concluded that "[t]he language of the statute is ambiguous at
best and the ambiguity is unresolved by legislative history."343
The Court had previously ruled, however, that "the statute
generally applies to 'establishments' of any kind, implicitly
interpreting that phrase as separate from and not modified or
limited by the phrase 'wholesale and retail.' "344 The Court
adopted this interpretation in Cahill.
The only remaining question, then, was whether dental
offices are covered in the meaning of the term "establishments
dealing with goods or services of any kind." Because dental
offices "provide services to the public," the Court concluded, they
are places of public accommodation. 345 The fact that such offices
are located on private premises, or that clients are generally
seen by appointment, did not alter the Court's conclusion.
Dentists draw clients through advertisements, telephone
listings, referrals, and, in the case of one of the defendants, by a
signs displayed on the premises.3 46 Significantly, defendants did
not claim that their practices were limited in any way. Neither
of the defendants "offered evidence that his patient roster was
selective or exclusive, or that his practice was not generally held
open to the public."3 47 Indeed, in one of the cases before the
Court, the complainant "walked into the office as a new patient
without an appointment and originally was accepted for
treatment."348 Accordingly, the Court found that dental offices
"are generally open to all comers" and are thus places of public
accommodation. 349 The Court noted, finally, that the decision
would not result in any hardship to dentists, because "all
licensed health care workers in this State are required to use
341 Id. at 276 (internal quotations omitted).
342 Id. (citing U.S. Power Squadrons, 452 N.E.2d. at 1203).
343 Id. at 276.
344 Id. at 277 (citing U.S. Power Squadrons, 452 N.E.2d at 1204).
345 Id. at 276.
346 Id. at 277.
347 Id.
348 Id.
349 Id.
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'universal precautions' in all situations in which there is
potential for the transmission of virus [es] .350
The Court's reasoning in Cahill was sound. The statute was
indeed ambiguous, like so many state public accommodation
statutes.351 The simple use of a comma to convey an expansive
reading ("wholesale and retail stores, and establishments
dealing with goods or services of any kind") or a virgule to convey
a restrictive reading ("wholesale and retail stores/establishments
dealing with goods or services of any kind") would have clarified
the Legislature's intent. The Legislature provided neither,
leaving it to the courts to divine the scope of the statute. The
courts were not, however, without guidance. Under established
New York law, remedial statutes such as the Human Rights Law
must be construed broadly to effectuate their purpose.3 52
Significantly, in the Human Rights Law, the Legislature codified
this general principle in the statute itself, expressly mandating
that "[tihe provisions of this article shall be construed liberally
for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof."353  More
specifically, over a decade before Cahill, the Court concluded
that the statute "defines 'place of public accommodation, resort
or amusement' inclusively and illustratively, and sets forth an
extensive list of examples of places within the statute."354 The
Legislature, moreover, expanded this definition over the years,
"a clear indication that the Legislature intended that the
definition of place of accommodation should be interpreted
broadly."355
Thus, in several cases leading up to Cahill, the Court
refused to construe the public accommodations language
narrowly. As the Court explained, "[I]t is the duty of courts to
350 Id. at 278 (citation omitted).
351 See, e.g., Steven B. Arbuss, The Unruh Civil Rights Act: An Uncertain
Guarantee, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 443 (1983); Michelle L. Carusone, Dale v. Boy
Scouts of America and Monmouth Council- New Jersey's Attempt to Define Places of
Public Accommodation and Remedy the "Cancer of Discrimination," 49 CATH. U. L.
REV. 823, 852-58 (2000).
352 See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989); Sanders v.
Winship, 442 N.E.2d 1231, 1233 (N.Y. 1982) ("Our analysis may well start with the
obvious fact that the statute, expressive of fundamental State policy and expressly
purposed to combat the specific discrimination quoted above, is to be regarded as
remedial in nature and, therefore, liberally construed.") (citations omitted).
353 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 300 (McKinney 1993 and Supp. 2000).
354 U.S. Power Squadrons, 452 N.E.2d at 1202-03.
355 Id. at 1203.
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make sure that the Human Rights Law works and that the
intent of the Legislature is not thwarted by a combination of
strict construction of the statute and a battle with semantics."35 6
The Court refused "to assume that, in framing such a statute,
the Legislature did not act with a consciousness that anti-
discrimination edicts all too commonly are circumvented unless
they are comprehensive in their application."357' After all, the
general purpose of the statute "is a more important aid to the
meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay
down."358
Finally, it is also established under New York law that
where there is doubt as to the meaning of terms, and a choice
between two constructions is afforded, courts will adopt the
construction that avoids injustice, hardship, or other
objectionable results.359  Given the Legislature's express
directive that the statute be liberally construed, the broad and
inclusive language of the subsection in question, and the
established principles of statutory construction favoring a liberal
construction, the Court's inclusive reading of the statute was
wholly appropriate. 360 As the Court eloquently explained:
To hold otherwise would impute to the Legislature approval of
legal discrimination by dentists (and other health care
providers) on the basis of disability, race, gender, or any other
protected classifications. Finding a categorical exemption in
this context would signify that the Legislature intended that
persons with disabilities should be free from discrimination in
such places as ice cream parlors and skating rinks, but that
dental and medical providers could lawfully deny health care to
them solely on the basis of their disability, a result wholly
356 City of Schenectady v. State Div. of Human Rights, 335 N.E.2d 290, 295
(N.Y.1975)).
357 Sanders, 442 N.E.2d at 1233 (N.Y. 1982)
358 Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543 N.E.2d 51 (N.Y. 1989) (citation and internal
quotations omitted)
359 See, e.g., In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405 (N.Y. 1995); Braschi, 543 N.E.2d
at 51.
360 See Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Comm'n on Human Rights and
Opportunities, 528 A.2d 352, 358 (Conn. 1987) (examining a public accommodations
law deemed ambiguous on the point at issue). The court found that "the
unconditional language of the statute, the history of its steadily expanded coverage,
and the compelling interest in eliminating discriminatory public accommodation
practices persuade us that the physical situs is not today an essential element of our
public accommodation law." Id.
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inconsistent with the purposes of the Human Rights Law. 361
The dissent made no mention of the general purpose of the
Human Rights Law. Likewise, the dissent did not begin its
analysis by acknowledging that the Court must construe the
statute liberally to effectuate its remedial purpose. Instead, in
its opening sentence, the dissent complained that the Court's
construction "will result in an explosive increase in the
jurisdiction of the State Division of Human Rights."362 The
question whether the Court's interpretation would increase
jurisdiction-and thus litigation-was irrelevant, however, to
the question whether dental offices are covered under the
statute.
In addition, if the Legislature had intended to restrict the
jurisdiction of the Division of Human Rights, it would not have
included explicit language mandating a liberal, rather than
restrictive, reading of the statute. The Legislature plainly
intended an expansive jurisdiction to eradicate the cancer of
discrimination 363 throughout the State of New York, save in
narrowly enumerated circumstances. Indeed, as noted, even
without this explicit language, courts must construe statutes
such as the Human Rights Law liberally to effectuate their
overarching, and noble, purpose.364 Hence, it is neither an
argument against a liberal interpretation nor a proper subject of
lamentation that the Court's ruling will expand the protections
against discrimination in New York State. Rather, it is cause for
celebration when the Court can strike down discriminatory
practices such as those at issue in Cahill while in no way
abrogating-indeed while furthering-the Legislature's intent
and purpose. In any event, if the Court had been mistaken in its
interpretation, the Legislature could have amended the statute
to clarify its intent.365 It did not.
361 Cahill v. Rosa, 674 N.E.2d 274, 277-78 (N.Y. 1996).
362 Id. at 278-79 (Levine, J., dissenting).
363 See Carusone, supra note 351, at 864 ("the goal of public accommodation
statutes is to eradicate the invidious 'cancer of discrimination' ") (quoting Fuchilla v.
Layman, 537 A.2d 652, 660 (N.J. 1988)).
364 See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
365 See Joseph William Singer, No Right to.Exclude: Public Accommodations
and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996) (urging a liberal interpretation
of the public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and noting
that "if the Court is mistaken in its interpretation, Congress can always correct the
mistake by amendatory legislation").
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Finally, the Cahill decision simply brought New York in
accord with the contemporary view of dental offices as places of
public accommodation. The Americans with Disabilities Act,
enacted by Congress in 1990, expressly includes, as a place of
public accommodation, "a professional office of a health care
provider, hospital, or other service establishment."366  This
includes dental offices. 367  The dissent, concerned with the
"traditional uses of the phrase,"368 failed to grasp this fact,
arguing that a dental office "traditionally lacks that openness of
access by the general public that has been an essential
characteristic of a place of public accommodation." 369 The facts
in Cahill demonstrate that if this was traditionally the case, it is
no longer.370 As one commentator explained, "Rigidly enforcing
outdated conceptions of what constitutes a 'place of public
accommodation' might have the effect of enshrining public
policies that are outdated and have been repudiated by later
legislation."371 Fortunately, the majority in Cahill refused to do
so.
VII. MIXON v. GRINKER (1996)
A. Background
In Mixon v. Grinker,37 2 petitioners challenged the adequacy
of New York City's program to provide emergency housing for
homeless persons living with HIV illness but not AIDS, as
defined by the CDC. Petitioners asserted that placing
individuals living with HIV illness in the city's barracks-style
shelters, where many residents have infectious diseases,
endangered the lives of such severely immuno-compromised
individuals. Petitioners argued that the city was required to
provide them with "medically appropriate housing which
36 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(f) (1990).
367 D.B. v. Bloom, 896 F. Supp. 166, 170 (D.N.J. 1995) ("[A] dental services
provider is a place of public accommodation by the terms of the ADA."); Abbot v.
Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 585 n.1 (D. Maine 1995), affd, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir.
1997), vacated and remanded 524 U.S. 624 (1998); United States v. Morvant, 898 F.
Supp. 1157 (E.D. La. 1995).
368 Cahill v. Rosa, 674 N.E.2d 274, 281 (N.Y. 1996) (emphasis added).
369 Id. at 280 (emphasis added).
370 See supra notes 346-49 and accompanying text.
371 Singer, supra note 365, at 1423.
372 669 N.E.2d 819 (N.Y. 1996).
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includes, at a minimum, a private sleeping area and sanitary
facilities."373
After petitioners filed suit, the city devised a Comprehensive
Care Program (CCP), under which homeless persons living with
HIV illness or in frail condition were placed in "dormitory" style
rooms, with up to twelve persons in a room.37 4 Residents shared
common eating and bathroom facilities and received enhanced
nutrition and on-site medical coverage.37 5 Individuals seeking
admission to this housing were required to submit to a skin test
and an X-ray to detect tuberculosis (TB). Those with infectious
TB would not be admitted but would instead be referred to a
hospital.37 6 As the trial court explained, however:
[Ilt was established at trial that the skin test and X-ray cannot
always determine the existence of active TB in a person with an
HIV infection because of the manner in which the body's
immune system is damaged. This is especially so with respect
to persons with multiple drug resistant TB, a condition
prevalent among many homeless persons who have failed to
complete a prior prescribed regimen of drug treatment for TB.
Tests to determine whether a person has multiple drug
resistant TB can take several months.377
The city argued that the CCP was nonetheless a "rational means
of allocating scarce resources among the many homeless persons
seeking public assistance."378
Judge Edward H. Lehner of the New York Supreme Court
explained that the city's regulation "must, unless irrational, be
upheld by the courts which should not determine which of
conflicting medical opinions is correct."379 Judge Lehner found,
however, that "a program that can place as many as 12 persons
with weakened immune systems in a single room lacks a rational
basis."380 Judge Lehner emphasized that the city could not
reliably determine whether a person was suffering from multiple
drug resistant TB,38 ' a disease that had "reached nearly
373 Mixon v. Grinker, 595 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993).
374 Id. at 879.
375 Mixon, 669 N.E.2d at 820.
376 Mixon, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
377 Id. at 879.
378 Id.
379 Id. at 880.
380 Id.
381 For a discussion and scientific explanation of multi-drug resistant
tuberculosis, see Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Resurgent Tuberculosis Epidemic in the
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epidemic proportions among the homeless who are HIV
infected."382 This could lead to individuals spreading the illness
throughout the program for months before being detected, a
danger also posed by "other infectious diseases."38 3
Based on the extensive testimony proffered at trial, Judge
Lehner found that there were -"'emergency circumstances'
presented by the unfortunate fate of the plaintiffs who have no
home and face an uncertain future as a result of being infected
with an illness that regrettably still is not fully understood."38 4
And while he refused to order the city to provide petitioners with
housing in private rooms, as provided to persons living with
AIDS, Judge Lehner ruled that, "under the circumstances it
would be irrational to place more than four persons of the
plaintiff class in one room."385 Judge Lehner specified that beds
in the facilities should be no closer than eight feet apart; that
rooms should be properly ventilated; and that residents should
be given the option to eat and use bathroom facilities separate
from the general population of the facilities.38 6
On appeal from both parties, the Appellate Division, First
Department ("First Department"), quoting McCain v. Koch,38 7
ruled that when the government undertakes to provide
emergency housing for the homeless, "it must do so in a way
'which satisfies minimum standards of sanitation, safety and
decency.' ",388 Indeed, citing a string of cases, the First
Department explained that "the judiciary has consistently acted
to guarantee minimum health and safety standards for
emergency housing."3 9  The voluminous record in Mixon 390
supported the trial court's finding that the CCP's tests failed
reliably to detect multiple drug resistant TB, a disease of "near
epidemic proportions among the homeless who are HIV
Era of AIDS: Reflections on Public Health, Law, and Society, 54 MD. L. REV. 1, 15-
17 (1995); see also Bradford, supra note 180.
382 Id. at 880.
383 Id.
384 Id. at 880-81.
385 Id. at 881.
386 Id.
387 511 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1987).
388 Mixon v. Grinker, 627 N.Y.S.2d 668, 672 (1st Dep't 1995).
389 Id. at 674.
390 The First Department noted that the record consisted of "ten bound
volumes." Id. at 675.
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infected."391  Thus, because the city's housing "fail[ed] to
sufficiently protect [petitioners] against the dangers of
tuberculosis," the CCP did not meet the minimum standards
required under McCain.392
Because the trial court's plan would not improve the CCP,
the First Department vacated the plan and remanded the case
for a hearing as to the modifications required to make the City's
housing "minimally habitable."393 The ultimate plan, the First
Department observed, "must present more than an illusion of
protecting the HIV-ill from exposure to tuberculosis."394 The
First Department agreed with the trial court that there is no
constitutional or statutory requirement "per se" that the city
provide petitioners with the same housing provided to homeless
persons living with AIDS.395 The court noted, however, that the
Supreme Court may well conclude that the only manner to
provide "'minimally habitable'" emergency housing to petitioners
is through the use of one or more forms of housing offered to
homeless persons living with AIDS.396
In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed.
B. The Decision
After setting forth the facts, the Court explained its
reasoning in two short paragraphs, in which the Court merely
distinguished Mixon from the Court's decision in McCain. The
Court explained that the First Department's reliance upon
McCain "as authority for their judicial scrutiny of the CCP was
misplaced."397  The Court's equitable authority to fashion
minimal standards of habitability "is an extraordinary judicial
task reserved for a situation when no departmental guidelines
exist."398 Indeed, in McCain, the Court emphasized that "[iut was
because of the absence of any departmental regulation that it
was necessary for the court to establish its own minimum
standards ."399
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 Id. (quoting McCain v. Koch, 511 N.E.2d 62, 66 (N.Y. 1987)).
394 Id.
395 Id. at 675.
396 Id.
397 Mixon v. Grinker, 669 N.E.2d 819, 820 (N.Y. 1996).
398 Id.
399 Id.
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Once the government "adopted regulations establishing
standards of minimal habitability," however, "so long as the
regulations are in effect, no question can exist concerning the
minimum standards for the accommodations to be provided."400
In Mixon, in contrast to McCain, the city formulated "a
comprehensive program,... with input from public health
experts including the director of the AIDS Institute, for housing
HIV-ill and other medically frail individuals."401 Under such
circumstances, the Court ruled, "McCain does not confer upon
plaintiffs the rights to plenary judicial review of the merits of the
special medical needs housing program embodied in
departmental guidelines ."402
After eight years of litigation, with a lengthy trial,
"voluminous exhibits,"403 and an appellate record of "ten bound
volumes,"40 4 the Court refused even to consider the facts, or
petitioners' legal claims. The Court's deference to the city was
not merely substantial; it was absolute. Indeed, unlike the lower
courts, the Court did not review the CCP with even minimal,
"rational basis" scrutiny. Instead, the Court imposed no
standard at all, perfunctorily declaring that petitioners had no
right to challenge the city's plan on any basis.40 5 Most troubling
of all, the Court did so despite the findings of two lower courts,
including the trier of fact, that the city's plan created "emergency
circumstances,"406  exposing petitioners to illnesses that
"endanger the health and safety of individuals who are among
the most vulnerable."4 7  The Court thus violated a well-
established principle of appellate review: "A trial court's finding
of fact, if affirmed by the Appellate Division, is beyond the
review powers of this Court [of Appeals] provided the finding is
supported by evidence on the record."408
400 Id.
401 Id. at 821.
402 Id. (citing N.Y. State Soc'y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605 (N.Y.
1991)).
403 Mixon v. Grinker, 627 N.Y.S.2d 668, 675 (1st Dep't 1995).
404 Id.
405 See Mixon v. Grinker, 669 N.E.2d 819, 821 (N.Y. 1996).
406 Mixon v. Grinker, 595 N.Y.S.2d 876, 881 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993)
(internal quotations omitted).
407 Mixon, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
408 Stiles v. Batavia Atomic Horseshoes, Inc., 613 N.E.2d 572, 573-74 (N.Y.
1993) (citations omitted); accord Huntley v. State, 464 N.E.2d 467, 468 (N.Y. 1984)
("Where... [affirmed] findings [of fact] are supported by evidence in the record,
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In support of its decision, the Court cited only two cases:
McCain and Axelrod. Ironically, however, both of these cases
unequivocally established petitioners' right to judicial review of
the city's plan under a rational basis analysis. The Court relied
heavily upon a passage in McCain stating that "so long as the
regulations are in effect, no question can exist concerning the
minimum standards for the accommodations to be provided."40 9
The McCain Court directed this language not at petitioners,
however, but at the government. The government had
challenged the right of petitioners to demand minimum
standards of habitability in the shelters. The Court pointed out
that, while the litigation was pending, the city's obligation to
provide minimum standards of habitability had been codified in
departmental regulations. So long as those regulations
remained in effect, the city could not challenge its obligation to
meet the minimum standards established, because "they [were]
commanded by statute to do so."410 The Court was certainly not
seeking to establish, wholly without precedent, that petitioners
could never challenge a plan adopted by the city on any grounds.
Indeed, the Court in McCain confirmed that petitioners could
challenge the city's regulation, albeit on limited grounds: "The
regulation, reflecting the choice made by the department,... is
beyond our power to disturb unless. it is 'so lacking in reason for
its promulgation that it is essentially arbitrary.' "411
In Axelrod, the Court confirmed the right of petitioners to
challenge the determinations of public health experts. There,
the Court explained: "Our review is limited to whether
respondents' determination is rationally based, i.e., whether it is
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious."412 The right to challenge
governmental actions or decisions as unreasonable, irrational, or
arbitrary and capricious is, in fact, well established in New York
law.413 Consequently, even the city in Mixon urged that the
they are conclusive in this court."); Rudman v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 280
N.E.2d 867, 871 (N.Y. 1972) ("As affirmed findings of fact, they are beyond this
court's power to review.").
409 669 N.E.2d at 820 (quoting McCain v. Koch, 511 N.E.2d 62, 66 (N.Y. 1987)).
410 McKain, 511 N.E.2d at 67 (citations omitted).
411 McKain, 511 N.E.2d at 66 (quoting Marburg v. Cole, 36 N.E.2d 113 (N.Y.
1941).
412 N.Y. State Soc'y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605, 609 (N.Y. 1991).
413 See, e.g., Flacke v. Onondaga Landfill Sys., Inc., 507 N.E.2d 282, 286 (N.Y.
1987); Ostrer v. Schenck, 364 N.E.2d 1107, 1109 (N.Y. 1977).
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Court apply rational basis scrutiny to their plan. 414
There was simply no basis, in McCain, Axelrod, or
otherwise, upon which to deny petitioners the right to judicial
review of the city's plan. The Court's complete refusal to
examine petitioners' claims was an unprecedented abdication of
the Court's duties. What is worse, it was an abdication in the
face of life-threatening, "emergency circumstances." The 1990s
witnessed a resurgence in TB, which disproportionately affected
both the homeless and people living with HIV.415 TB has long
been a significant problem in the homeless community, and
studies have confirmed that, "in many inner cities, the level of
[TB] among the homeless ranges from eighteen to seventy-nine
percent."416 To make matters far worse, persons living with HIV
are particularly susceptible to TB. "HIV-infected persons are the
most likely to contract TB because HIV severely weakens their
immune systems, thereby making them unable to extinguish the
TB infection."417  Persons living with AIDS, for example,
experience rates of TB 500 times greater than the general
population. 418 And persons living with HIV are 40 times more
likely to progress to active tuberculosis following infection than
persons who are not living with HIV.419
The resurgence in TB was also characterized by a high
414 Mixon v. Grinker, 627 N.Y.S.2d 668, 673 (1st Dep't 1995).
415 See, e.g., ISBELL, supra note 180, at 57; Peter F. Barnes & Susan A.
Barrows, Tuberculosis in the 1990s, 119 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 400 (1993); Gostin,
supra note 381, at 30-31 ("The HIV epidemic has fueled the resurgence of
tuberculosis in major urban areas such as New York .... ").
416 Gostin, supra note 381, at 41; accord Patti E. Phillips, Adding Insult to
Injury: The Lack of Medically-Appropriate Housing for the Homeless HIV-Ill, 45 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 567, 578 (1991) ("The incidence of tuberculosis, for example, is
disproportionately high among shelter residents and people living on the streets.").
417 Bradford, supra note 180, at 289; accord Gostin, supra note 381, at 31-32
("Many clinicians have long believed that persons with HIV infection are at
increased risk of contracting [tuberculosis] infection following exposure, and recent
investigations of tuberculosis outbreaks in congregate settings have strongly
supported this clinical perception."); Karen H. Rothenberg and Elizabeth C. Lovoy,
Something Old, Something New: The Challenge of Tuberculosis Control in the Age of
AIDS, 42 BuFF. L. REV. 715, 724 (1994) ("The recent rise in TB is especially
alarming for HIV-infected individuals, who are particularly susceptible to the
disease.").
418 John F. Jewett & Frederick M. Hecht, Preventive Health Care for Adults
with HIV Infection, 269 JAMA 1144, 1147 (March 3, 1993) ('The incidence of
tuberculosis (TB) is substantially increased in HIV-infected individuals, occurring
500 times more commonly in patients with AIDS than in the general population.").
419 See Gostin, supra note 381, at 32.
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incidence of multiple drug resistant TB,420 which, as the lower
courts in Mixon explained, had "reached near epidemic
proportions among the homeless who are HIV infected." 421
Multiple drug resistant TB was (and is) devastating for people
living with HIV. In one CDC study conducted in the early 1990s,
the mortality rate for multiple drug resistant TB in persons
living with HIV ranged from 72 to 89 percent, and the median
time between diagnosis and death was four to sixteen weeks. 422
Finally, as petitioners in Mixon demonstrated, congregate
shelters are extremely conducive to the spread of tuberculosis,
particularly among the immunocompromised. As Lawrence
Gostin explains:
If a person were to set out to design facilities that efficiently
transmit airborne diseases,'then that person might well
emulate the physical conditions found in congregate settings in
America, such as... homeless shelters .... In many of these
settings, residents live, eat, and sleep in small enclosed spaces;
beds are inches or feet apart; and buildings are dark and poorly
ventilated. Moreover, the residents of many of these
congregate facilities are impoverished, malnourished, and
overrepresented in populations that have disproportionately
high rates of comminicable disease, and in populations that
have significantly impeded access to health care services. 423
Because TB tests fail accurately to screen for multiple drug
resistant TB,424 the city's plan of housing up to 12 individuals in
a room placed petitioners at imminent risk of contracting a
profoundly lethal illness-TB. As the trial court pointed out,
this was also true of other infectious diseases. 425  There is
420 See ISBELL, supra note 180, at 57.
421 Mixon v. Grinker, 595 N.Y.S.2d 876, 880 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993).
422 See Gostin, supra note 381, at 33; Rothenberg, supra note 417, at 726.
423 See Gostin, supra note 381, at 49.
424 See Mixon v. Grinker, 627 N.Y.S.2d 668, 675 (1st Dep't 1995); see also
Gostin, supra note 381, at 35 ("[The damage to the immune system caused by HIV
makes the tuberculin skin test unreliable."); Jewett & Hecht, supra note 418, at
1147 ("The accuracy of tuburculin testing is diminished by anergy in HIV-infected
individuals."); Rothenberg and Lovoy, supra note 417, at 725 ("Because HIV
infection can depress the body's immune response to infection, approximately ten to
eighty percent of HIV-infected individuals with TB produce a negative TB skin
test.").
42 See Mixon, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 880. As one commentator explains:
The HIV-ill are in great danger of developing full-blown AIDS when placed
in shelters where the incidence of infectious diseases is very high.
Alternatively, the HIV-ill who stay away from shelters because of violence
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nothing rational about a plan that places countless individuals
at imminent risk of illness and death.
Ironically, perhaps the keenest criticism of Mixon is
contained in the First Department's decision. Rejecting the city's
argument that the court should refrain from critically assessing
the plan, the First Department explained:
While we are cognizant of our role in a tripartite system of
government, we decline to adopt the defendants' narrow view
which would, in essence, convert the courts into a rubber stamp
for any policy developed by municipal and state agencies. If, as
here, contradictory evidence has been proffered at a non-jury
trial, the court not only has the power, but, in fact, has an
affirmative duty to weigh, assess, and evaluate such evidence.
In doing so, the court may consider those factors ordinarily
considered by a finder of fact in assessing credibility and it need
not turn a blind and uncritical eye to the testimony of witnesses
who, as authors and proponents of a given policy, have a vested
interest in its being upheld. Indeed, when, as here, there is
compelling evidence which undermines the purported rationale
of an agency's decision or proposal, a court should not fail to act
simply out of deference to an agency's proposal, particularly
when such a failure would endanger the health and safety of
individuals who are among the most vulnerable and least able
to obtain redress through the other branches of government. 426
In this passage, the First Department has succinctly
conveyed the impropriety of absolute deference to a
governmental body, particularly in the face of compelling
evidence and life-threatening circumstances. Ignoring these
critical points, the Court in Mixon assumed, without further
examination, an infallible government incapable of abridging the
rights of its citizens. The facts in Mixon, however, make it
abundantly clear that the government is eminently fallible. On
the rationale that the relief petitioners sought would be
"financially burdensome or inconvenient," the city refused to
alter a plan that both the trier of fact and the First Department
concluded, upon a voluminous record, "fail[ed] to sufficiently
or poor conditions live in alleys, under bridges, in subways, and on
benches. They encounter formidable obstacles in obtaining showers,
adequate rest, and nutritional meals, which also puts them in great danger
of developing full-blown AIDS.
Phillips, supra note 416, at 578.
426 Mixon, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 674 (emphasis added).
[Vol.76:115
HIVIAIDS IN THE NEW YORK COURTS
protect [petitioners] against the dangers of tuberculosis." 427
Tragically, "[biecause of the overall political impotence and
powerlessness of today's homeless population, homeless [persons
living with AIDS] lack the requisite constituency ... to effect
majoritarian reform."428 The Court's refusal to examine the
substantial evidence on appeal ensured that the most
disenfranchised of citizens-indigent, homeless individuals
living with HIV illness-would find no forum in which to obtain
relief from the mortal threat of congregate shelter.
VIII. HERNANDEZ V. BARRIOS-PAOLI (1999)
A. Background
In Hernandez v. Barrios-Paoli,429 the Court considered the
appeal of Daniel Hernandez ("Mr. Hernandez"), a poor person
living with clinical/symptomatic HIV illness or AIDS and a client
of the New York City Human Resources Administration's (HRA)
Division of AIDS Services Income Support (DASIS) (collectively,
"Respondents"). As the Court explained, "DASIS is an agency
within the Department of Social Services established
administratively by HRA in 1985 to assist persons with
clinical/symptomatic HIV illness or AIDS in securing vital public
benefits and services."430 Mr. Hernandez brought suit under
recently-enacted provisions of the New York City Administrative
Code (the "DASIS Law")431 that, he claimed, eliminated
Respondents' Eligibility Verification Review (EVR) for clients of
DASIS.
The administration of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani implemented
the EVR requirement in 1995 ostensibly to verify clients'
eligibility for public assistance and to ferret out fraud.432 The
EVR program, administered by staff of HRA's Office of Revenue
427 Id. at 675.
428 Phillips, supra note 416, at 570 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
429 720 N.E.2d 866 (N.Y. 1999).
430 See Merjian, supra note 2, at 379-83 (describing the problems faced by
persons living with AIDS in obtaining social welfare benefits and the adoption of the
DASIS Law to codify basic protections and modifications on their behalf).
431 N.Y. CITY ADMIN CODE §§ 21-126 to 21-128 (Lenz & Riecker, Inc. 2001). The
DASIS Law was signed into law in 1997; see Hernandez, 720 N.E.2d at 867.
432 See Hernandez, 720 N.E.2d at 867; see infra notes 455-58 and accompanying
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and Investigation and not by staff of DASIS,433 required all
clients to travel to Brooklyn, New York for an investigatory
interview, followed by a mandatory home visit. Clients who
failed to comply with the EVR requirement could be denied
benefits on that basis,434 and benefits would not be provided
until clients completed the entire process. The Court noted, for
example, that Respondents informed Mr. .Hernandez that
"without an EVR interview, he would not receive public
assistance."435  The EVR requirement merely duplicated,
however, the verification process undertaken in all cases by
DASIS staff, who conduct eligibility interviews and home visits
to determine eligibility.436
"In recognition of the severe limitations and chronic health
problems that persons with AIDS face," Mr. Hernandez argued
that "the New York City Council enacted the DASIS Law in July
of 1997 to facilitate DASIS clients' access to crucial benefits and
services, to eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles, and to
decrease the chance that DASIS clients will have vital benefits
unnecessarily delayed, interrupted, or terminated."437
Specifically, Mr. Hernandez argued that three independently
dispositive provisions of the DASIS law eliminated the EVR
requirement for clients of DASIS, in recognition of their special
needs, that the DASIS Law requires that DASIS clients be
assisted to "establish any and all elements of eligibility" for
benefits and services by "staff of' DASIS, and "at a single
location";438 and that the law prohibits the imposition of
433 See Hernandez, 720 N.E.2d at 868.
434 Id.
435 Id. at 867.
436 See id. at 868 ("The DASIS staff member conducts a field visit and a public
assistance interview to establish eligibility for publicly subsidized benefits.").
437 Br. for Appellant at 1, Hernandez v. Barrios-Paoli, 720 N.E.2d 866 (N.Y.
1999) [hereinafter Appellant's Briefi. As the DASIS Law states, the purpose of
DASIS is to "provide access to benefits and services" to every New Yorker with
clinical/symptomatic HIV illness or with AIDS. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 21-127
(Lenz & Riecker, Inc. 2001).
438 Both of these requirements are contained in Section 21-128(a)(1) of the
DASIS Law, which provides, in relevant part:
Access to benefits and services shall mean the provision of assistance by
staff of the division to a person with clinical/symptomatic HIV'illness or
with AIDS at a single location in order to apply for publicly subsidized
benefits and services, to establish any and all elements of eligibility
including, but not limited to, those elements required to be established for
financial benefits, and to maintain such eligibility ....
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"requirements with respect to ... eligibility for benefits and
services" that are "more restrictive than those requirements
mandated by state or federal statute, law, regulation or rule."439
Mr. Hernandez argued that because EVR is conducted by
persons who are not "staff of' DASIS, because the EVR process
violates the requirement that eligibility be .established "at a
single location," and because EVR is an additional eligibility
requirement imposed by the city that is not requifred under state
or federal law, it is expressly prohibited by the DASIS Law. 440
The supreme court agreed with Mr. Hernandez, ruling that
the DASIS Law plainly and expressly eliminates the EVR
requirement for DASIS clients.441 The Appellate Division, First
Department ("First Department"), unanimously reversed. 442
The Court granted permission to appeal and unanimously
reversed, reinstating the supreme court's injunction eliminating
EVR for DASIS clients.
B. The Decision
The Court began its analysis by examining the plain
meaning of the DASIS Law, 443 followed by analysis of the spirit
and purpose of the statute and the objectives that the
Legislature sought to accomplish. "Indeed," the Court explained,
"the general spirit and purpose of the statute is an important aid
in understanding the meaning, of its words." 444  The EVR
requirement, the Court found, violated the plain meaning of the
DASIS law and contravened its purpose.
The DASIS Law "makes clear that DASIS staff, rather than
EVR investigators, must provide and ensure access to benefits
and services," the Court ruled, including "'establishing any and
all elements of eligibility * * * including those elements required
to be established for financial benefits, and to maintain such
N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 21-128(a)(1) (Lenz & Riecker, Inc. 2001) (emphasis
added).
439 N.Y. CITYADMIN. CODE § 21-128(b) (Lenz & Riecker, Inc. 2001).
440 See Appellant's Brief, supra note 437,'at 1.
441 Hernandez v. Barrios-Paoli, 669 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1998),
rev'd, 677 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1st Dep't 1998), rev'd, 720 N.E.2d 866 (N.Y. 1999).
442 Hernandez v. Barrios-Paoli, 677 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1st Dep't 1998), rev'd, 720
N.E.2d 866 (N.Y. 1999).
443 See Hernandez, 720 N.E.2d at 868 ("[We begin our analysis with the
familiar maxim that statutory interpretation requires courts to first look to the
plain meaning of the words of a statute.").
44 Id.
................... L .........
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eligibility.' "445 In addition, section 21-128(b) expressly states:
"The requirements with respect to such access to and eligibility
for benefits and services shall not be more restrictive than those
requirements mandated by state or federal statute, law,
regulation or rule."446 Although State statutes and regulations
may authorize the EVR requirement, the Court ruled, that "they
do not mandate it."44v Hence, because EVR was not conducted by
DASIS staff, and because the EVR requirement 448 was not
mandated by State law or regulation, it was prohibited under the
plain meaning of the DASIS Law.449
The Court found that the spirit and purpose of the DASIS
Law also compelled the Court's decision. The DASIS Law was
unquestionably "enacted to facilitate access to necessary public
benefits and services for individuals suffering from
clinical/symptomatic HIV illness and AIDS in New York City."450
The Court's decision to eliminate the EVR requirement for
DASIS clients was "consistent with the explicit intent of city
445 Id. In unanimously reversing the supreme court, the First Department
made a new and wholly erroneous finding of fact essentially to abrogate this
provision. Specifically, the First Department found that "DASIS staff are not
intended to make eligibility determinations, but only to provide the necessary
assistance in securing benefits." Hernandez, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 536. Hence, "the use of
non-DASIS staff for the EVR process does not violate Local Law 49." Id. The First
Department's reasoning appears to have been that, since DASIS does not establish
eligibility, the City Council could not have meant what it expressly said when it
required that only DASIS staff assist DASIS clients in establishing any and all
elements of eligibility. As we have seen, however, DASIS staff indeed establish
eligibility for all DASIS clients, making the EVR requirement duplicative. See supra
note 436 and accompanying text.
446 Hernandez, 720 N.E.2d at 869 (quoting N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 21-128(b)
(Lenz & Riecker, Inc. 2001)) (emphasis added by the Court).
7 Id.
448 The Court rejected Respondents' argument that EVR was a "Process" rather
than a requirement, noting, inter alia, that "the very notice sent by EVR
investigators to an applicant who fails to complete an EVR interview states that
'[c]ompliance with the EVR review is an eligibility requirement.' " Hernandez, 720
N.E.2d at 868.
449 The Court did not address Mr. Hernandez's contention that the EVR
requirement also violated the requirement that all elements of eligibility be
established at a single location, and argument which the Supreme Court fully
credited: "The Code plainly requires that persons with HIV/AIDS be provided
assistance and be permitted to satisfy any and all eligibility elements at a single
location. The Administrative Code does not then require home visits and neither
shall the Court." Hernandez v. Barrios-Paoli, 669 N.Y.S.2d 195, 197 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1998), rev'd, 677 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1st Dep't 1998), rev'd, 720 N.E.2d 866 (N.Y.
1999).
450 Hernandez, 720 N.E.2d at 870.
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lawmakers to streamline eligibility determination procedures
and requirements for this unique group of public assistance
applicants, as evidenced by the words of the statute and the
legislative history."45' The Court rejected Respondent's
argument that if the City Council had intended to eliminate
EVR, then they would have mentioned it by name. 45 2
As the Court itself pointed out, the conclusion was
"manifest." The plain meaning of the DASIS Law clearly
eliminated the EVR requirement for DASIS clients. As the trial
court observed:
The approximately 18,000 New York City public assistance
recipients living with HIV and AIDS face unique challenges in
accessing public benefits and services, including greater
susceptibility to infection and the fear of HIV-related
discrimination. The DASIS law sensitively and sensibly
requires that such persons be provided access to public benefits
at a single location by staff trained to deal specifically with the
issues faced by persons living with HIV/AIDS. 453
The Court's reading was also wholly in keeping with the
spirit and purpose of the DASIS Law, and with the City
Council's manifest intent in enacting the law: "to ease
unnecessary administrative burdens for public assistance
applicants suffering from clinical/symptomatic HIV illness or
AIDS in New York City."45 4
The EVR requirement is indeed a profound burden. The
Giuliani administration implemented EVR as part of an
unabashed attempt to reduce benefits to more than 100,000 New
York City residents within one year.45 5 As one commentator
451 Id. at 870.
452 Id. at 869-70.
453 Hernandez, 669 N.Y.S.2d at 198
454 Hernandez, 720 N.E.2d at 870. That the DASIS Law seeks, wherever
possible, to ease the burdens of individuals with clinical/symptomatic HIV disease
and AIDS in accessing and maintaining publicly-subsidized benefits and services is
apparent on the face of the statute. In addition to the provisions at issue in
Hernandez, the DASIS Law contains such provisions as "intensive case
management" for DASIS clients, with comparatively small case worker-to-client
ratios. See N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE § 21-127 (Lenz & Riecker, Inc. 2001). The DASIS
law also provides for the establishment of a "bill of rights for persons with
clinical/symptomatic HIV illness or with AIDS," id. § 21-128(h), strict limitations on
the termination of benefits and services for DASIS clients, id. § 21-128(f), and
"quality assurance measurements" for DASIS, id. § 21-128(i).
455 See David Firestone, 100,000 New Yorkers May Be Cut Off Welfare in
Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1995, at B1, col. 2.
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explained, the motive for EVR was clear: "[Tihe City sought to
impose administrative hoops and hurdles to reduce the number
of individuals on welfare."45 6 In so doing, the city set the stage
for tragic error and abuse:
Cases were frequently closed simply because there was nobody
at home to answer the questions, or because the forms slipped
under the door by EVR investigators failed to give instructions
in any language but English. In one incident, an individual's
case was closed because she was not present when the EVR
investigators dropped by her house; she was out at the work
program assigned to her by the very same welfare agency. 457
Indeed, a 1997 report by the nonpartisan Citizens Budget
Committee concluded that the vast majority of public welfare
recipients whose cases were closed had not committed fraud and
were entitled to the benefits and services that the city had
terminated.458
The burdens of EVR were only exacerbated for persons
living with AIDS. One city official reported, for example, that
some DASIS clients' public assistance cases were closed for
missing appointments even when they were prevented from
showing up by hospitalization. 459 As Mr. Hernandez pointed out:
EVR home 'visits are not conducted in a manner that is
sensitive or:' responsive to issues faced by persons with
clinical/symptomatic fIIIV illness or AIDS. Visits are not
scheduled for specific dates and times. Clients therefore
become virtual prisoners in their homes until a visit is
completed. In addition, the requirement to remain at home
often conflicts with medical appointments, attendance at adult
456 David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L.
REV. 231, 247 (1998); accord Peter M. Cicchino, The Problem Child: An Empirical
Survey and Rhetorical Analysis of Child Poverty in the United States, 5 J.L. & POLY
5, 82-83 (1996) ("EVR is a process that gathers no new information, contributes
nothing substantive to the determination of eligibility, but serves purely and simply
as another obstacle to prevent poor people from obtaining what paltry assistance
our society affords them.").
457 Kennedy, supra note 456, at 246.
458 See CITIZENS BUDGET COMMISSION, The State of Municipal Services in the
1990s: Social Services in New York City, Aug. 11, 1997; see also Lynette Holloway,
Report Says Errors, Not Fraud, Are the Biggest Reason New York City Cuts Off
Welfare,'N.Y. TIMES Aug. 12, 1997, at B3 ("The commission estimated that a vast
majority were dropped because of administrative errors or other reasons that had
nothing to do with fraud.").
459 See Denene Millner, Welfare Flap over AIDS Patients, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 16, 1995, at 38.
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day treatment programs, and other important obligations....
Yet, if the client is not home for some reason when the EVR
investigator visits, his or her application for public assistance,
rental assistance, food stamps, Medicaid, or other vital benefits
may be denied, delayed, or interrupted.
460
Elimination of the EVR requirement in no way prejudiced
Respondents, because they were certainly not prohibited from
ferreting out fraud as they always had-through the DASIS
eligibility specialists. The Court's decision thus had the virtue of
removing an onerous and unnecessary hurdle for this severely
immunocompromised population while in no way preventing
Respondents from complying with their obligations under the
law.
CONCLUSION
In his dissent in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,461 Justice
Brennan eloquently warned of the need vigilantly to guard the
rights of the imprisoned against the actions of prison officials:
Prisons may exist on the margins of [our] society, but no act of
will can sever them from the body politic. When prisoners
emerge from the shadows to press a constitutional claim, they
invoke no alien set of principles drawn from a distant culture.
Rather, they speak the language of the charter upon which all
of us rely to hold official power accountable. They ask us to
acknowledge that power exercised in the shadows must be
restrained at least as diligently as power that acts in the
sunlight. 462
Justice Brennan's admonition is particularly applicable to
the case of prisoners living with HIV and AIDS.463  Such
460 Appellant's Brief, supra note 437, at 4-5. Indeed, although Mr. Hernandez
had completed his application for Food Stamps and rent enhancement, and
although his application had in fact been approved, Respondents refused to release
his food stamps and the rent checks necessary to secure his new apartment-and to
end his homelessness-until and unless he completed the EVR requirement.
Respondents failed, however, to identify any necessary information or
documentation that Mr. Hernandez had not already provided to DASIS (and its
eligibility specialists). Id. at 6. As appellant explained: "Mr. Hernandez has no
savings and no place to go, and faces the very real prospect of homelessness, which
will likely aggravate his illness and might very well result in his death. The
respondents' failure to apply the DASIS law as written threatens Mr. Hernandez's
health, and potentially his life." Id. at 6.
461 482 U.S. 342 (1987)
462 Id. at 355 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
463 See, e.g., Note, Discrimination Against Prisoners with AIDS-Equal
2002]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
prisoners are doubly, even triply marginalized in our society:
they are living with a dreaded disease, they are incarcerated,
and, owing to the demographics of the disease, they are often
either persons of color, or present or former drug users.464 As
one commentator has observed, "Deference to the legislative and
executive branches, which are by definition more prone to the
prejudices and panic of the electorate, has led to hasty decision
making that results in the use of the most extreme responses to
the AIDS epidemic in the prison setting."465 The Court's decision
in Doe is a tragic example of this.
The unique characteristics of the AIDS epidemic render
Justice Brennan's words equally applicable to the decisions of
other public officials. In the face of the widespread panic and
prejudice engendered by an epidemic such as AIDS, courts must
carefully assess, rather than rubber stamp, the purported
justifications invoked by public officials to defend their actions.
Given the relative powerlessness of people living with HIV and
AIDS, the courts may well represent the only source of refuge,
Protection and Due Process Claims Arising from Segregation and Denial of Conjugal
Visits, 6 N.Y.L. SCH. J. Hum. RTs. 99, 99-100 (1988) ("Scapegoated throughout
society, incarcerated people are most likely to be punished for AIDS and the least
likely to get assistance.") (citation and internal quotations omitted).
464 See, e.g., Deborah Dalrymple-Blackburn, AIDS, Prisoners, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 839, 839-40 (1995) (citing the
"overrepresentation of intravenous drug users and minority groups in prison
populations"). The author notes that, among New York state inmates, 95% of the
AIDS cases reported through 1992 were attributed to injected drug use. Id. at 839-
40 n.7; see also Wendy E. Parmet & Daniel J. Jackson, No Longer Disabled: The
Legal Impact of the New Social Construction of HIV, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 29 ("By
the late 1980s... intravenous drug users and heterosexual people of color
increasingly contracted the disease. As they did, the connections between HIV
patients and mainstream America began to unravel. AIDS was becoming even more
and more a problem of socially outcast groups.").
465 Irene Lambrou, Comment, AIDS Behind Bars: Prison Responses and
Judicial Deference, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 327, 328 (1989); accord id. at 353 ("Judicial
deference to the activities of prison administrators has certainly cleared the way for
a panicked, misinformed public to mandate unjustified measures that often unduly
restrict the rights of prison inmates who have had the tragic misfortune to contract
a deadly, incurable disease."). Just months before the Court decided Doe, to take but
one example, United States Attorney General Edwin Meese suggested that some
prisoners carrying the HIV virus should not be paroled like other prisoners. See
Robert Pear, AIDS Tests Ordered for U.S. Prisoners and Immigration; Meese Details
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1987, at Al. Education Secretary William Bennett echoed
this sentiment. See Bennett Would Detain Some Carriers of AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 1987, at A13.
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and of justice, in a sea of hysteria and prejudice.466
Likewise, courts must not allow unfounded and outdated
claims of exigency to govern their decisions. As one New York
judge has observed, "It is incumbent upon the courts to render
determinations on the basis of sound legal principles with
guidance from the latest medical and scientific research
available."467 Too often, although not in all cases, the New York
Court of Appeals at the epicenter of the AIDS epidemic has
failed to do so.
In Hernandez, the Court showed great concern to protect the
rights of persons living with HIV and AIDS. Indeed, the Court
agreed to hear the appeal of a poor person living with AIDS
against State and city officials, and then proceeded unanimously
to reverse a unanimous appellate court ruling against the
appellant. As we enter the third decade of the AIDS crisis, let us
hope that this decision signals a greater awareness of and
sensitivity to the inherently fallible nature of "official" HIV and
AIDS policies.
466 As one commentator has explained:
Policymakers are tempted to confront AIDS primarily as a public health
matter while treating the liberty rights of HIV-positive individuals as
incidental. This temptation magnifies the historic counter-majoritarian
role of the judiciary in protecting the rights of individuals who-like the
HIV-positive--are viewed by a majority of the population as undesirable,
unpopular, and even dangerous
Doyle, supra note 67, at 378.
467 Doe v. Coughlin, 505 N.Y.S.2d 534, 536 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1986).
Ironically, this very judge failed to heed his own advice.
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